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Much of the current debate surrounding the integration of Muslims into Western 
countries is fueled by the belief that Islamic values are incompatible with those of the 
liberal democratic West. One area that could prove especially challenging for integration 
is education, as the foundational values of Islamic education would also, on this view, 
clash with the foundational values of liberal education. Could Islamic education ever be 
conducive to liberal values? If there is indeed a clash of civilizations at work here, then 
this seems unlikely. However, if the clash is overstated, then are there conditions under 
which at least some liberal democratic values could be promoted in Islamic schools? In 
this dissertation, I will partially address this question by focusing on one of the central 
liberal democratic values: autonomy. Specifically, my aim is to offer a modification to 
Harry Brighouse’s proposal for autonomy-facilitating education in order to suggest a 
curriculum that could be used to facilitate autonomy in a way that is compatible with 
some forms of Islamic education. I describe how this curriculum, called Worldview 
Education, can contribute to an autonomy-facilitating education in Islamic schools by 
engaging students with a variety of worldviews, as Brighouse proposes, while removing 
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THE TENSION BETWEEN AUTONOMY AND PLURALISM 
Much of the current debate surrounding the integration of Muslims into Western 
countries is fueled by the belief that Islamic values are incompatible with those of the 
liberal democratic West. For instance, there is a general impression among non-Muslims 
in the West that Islam is oppressive, denying personal autonomy (a central liberal 
democratic value) to its adherents.1 The practice of some Muslim women of wearing a 
veil or other head covering when in public is often cited as a visible example of this 
generalized oppression. The idea that there is an irreconcilable divide between Western 
and Islamic values was popularized by Samuel Huntington’s 1996 book, The Clash of 
Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, which proposes that Western and Islamic 
civilizations fundamentally clash with each other in such a way that they must always 
stand opposed.2 If this is true, then the integration of Muslim immigrants into Western 
countries would indeed be a difficult task: the fundamentally clashing values of the 
immigrants (e.g., a commitment to Islam and the worldwide Muslim community) would 
stand in the way of the embrace of liberal democratic values (e.g., a commitment to the 
primacy of the individual and the individual’s right to direct his or her own life) that is 
central to their integration into Western societies. One area that could prove especially 
                                                
1 I will give a simple definition of personal autonomy shortly, and I will discuss the concept at length in 
Chapter 3. 
2 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: 
Touchstone, 1996). 
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challenging for integration is education, as the foundational values of Islamic education 
would also, on this view, clash with the foundational values of liberal education. Could 
Islamic education ever be conducive to liberal values? If there is indeed a clash of 
civilizations at work here, then this seems unlikely. However, if the clash is overstated, 
then are there conditions under which at least some liberal democratic values could be 
facilitated in Islamic schools? 
In this dissertation, I will partially address this question by focusing on one of the 
central liberal democratic values: autonomy. Specifically, my aim is to offer a 
modification to Harry Brighouse’s proposal for autonomy-facilitating education in order 
to suggest a curriculum that could be used to facilitate autonomy in a way that is 
compatible with some forms of Islamic education.3 Before doing so, however, I want to 
be clear about what it means to provide an education that facilitates autonomy and why 
traditional ideas of how to do so raises concerns within the context of Islamic education. 
In order to do so, I will first describe specific forms of Islamic education and Brighouse’s 
proposal for autonomy-facilitating education. I will focus on three forms of Islamic 
education: one is a proposal by the Muslim scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi and two are 
Islamic schools that currently operate in the state of Illinois. These descriptions will lead 
into a contrast that will reveal some of the real differences between Islamic and liberal 
worldviews, especially with regard to the value of personal autonomy, or the ability of 
individuals to direct their own lives. This is a difference that must be taken into account 
when considering the Islamic education of children in liberal democratic societies. While 
liberalism defends the value of personal autonomy, it also defends the value of pluralism: 
                                                
3 Harry Brighouse, School Choice and Social Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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allowing a range of worldviews to flourish. This tension between autonomy and 
pluralism is inherent to liberalism — it is a clash of liberal values — and it cannot be 
avoided in questions that arise when considering how to deal with educational pluralism, 
such as that represented by Islamic education (and religious education generally), in a 
liberal society. 
The remainder of this chapter presents a motivational framework for my 
dissertation by connecting it to ongoing tensions raised by the increasing presence of 
Muslims in Western countries. First, I present two sources of tension that highlight the 
clash of civilizations framework that permeates popular and political discussions of 
Muslim integration in Western societies: the veil and the mosque. Then, I use Walter 
Feinberg’s book, For Goodness Sake, to introduce the specifically educational tensions 
that arise when considering the place of religious education in liberal democratic 
societies. Finally, I present a chapter-by-chapter outline of the dissertation, and a brief 
restatement of its primary goal. 
 
Sources of Tension Between Islam and the West: The Veil and the Mosque 
The increasing number of Muslims in North America and Europe, many of whom 
are immigrants, has led to discussion of how to integrate Muslims into Western liberal 
societies. In a February 2011 speech in Munich about Islamism and British values, the 
British Prime Minister David Cameron argued that what he called “state 
multiculturalism” had failed, leading many Britons to lead segregated lives, split between 
their cultures and their country. Cameron proposed to resolve this problem with a 
“muscular liberalism” that enforces a strong sense of British national identity across 
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cultures.4 This shows how the concern with integration is thought by some to be rooted in 
tensions between Islamic values and liberal values. In popular and political domains, 
these tensions have most notably coalesced around two issues: the veil and the mosque. 
These issues stand out because they are so visible: some Muslim women see the wearing 
of the veil or other head coverings when around non-family members as an important 
element of their religious expression, and immigrant Muslims need to build mosques in 
their new homes in which to worship. 
These issues have surfaced in the public discourse of liberal societies in a number 
of ways. For instance, France has banned the wearing of headscarves, along with other 
religious symbols, in its state schools; and Switzerland ignited controversy when it 
banned the building of minarets, the prayer towers of mosques, in 2009.5 While these 
occurrences raise important questions surrounding what it means to protect religious 
freedom in liberal pluralistic societies — should accommodations be made for religious 
practices that appear to conflict with liberal values? — I am interested here in examining 
what the arguments against both head coverings in public places and the construction of 
mosques reveal about the ways in which Islamic values are perceived as clashing with 
Western values. 
The 2004 banning of religious symbols, including Muslim headscarves, in French 
public schools is perhaps the best-known controversy involving Muslim head coverings, 
                                                
4 “Bagehot: Muscle v multiculturalism,” Economist, February 10, 2011, accessed January 21, 2012, 
http://www.economist.com/node/18112127?story_ID=18112127&fsrc=nlw|wwp|02-10-
2011|politics_this_week. 
5 See BBC News, “The Islamic Veil Across Europe,” last modified June 15, 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5414098.stm for a discussion of the banning of veils in Europe. See Nick 
Cumming-Bruce and Steven Erlanger, “Swiss Ban Building of Minarets on Mosques,” New York Times, 
November 30, 2009, accessed January 21, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/30/world/europe/30swiss.html for more on the Swiss ban on minarets. 
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but there have been other movements to ban the veil and its variants as well. In 
September 2010, the French parliament passed a law prohibiting the wearing of full-face 
Islamic veils in public places, which took effect in April 2011.6 In Spain, the lower house 
of its parliament narrowly voted down a proposal to ban the burqa (a full-body covering 
worn by some Muslim women) in public places, a proposal which the parliament’s upper 
house had already approved. However, at the local level, major Spanish cities, such as 
Barcelona, have proceeded with bans on full-face veils in public places.7 The lower house 
of the Belgian parliament has passed a similar measure, though recent shakeups in the 
Belgian government appear to have stalled its passage through its Senate for the time 
being. 
In a July 2010 essay on the New York Times “Opinionator” website, the 
philosopher Martha Nussbaum presents five arguments that are typically given in support 
of bans on veils or facial coverings.8 She aims to show that the bans cannot actually be 
justified by these arguments, since the arguments are clearly problematic, but rather that 
they are motivated by something else, and therefore amount to religious discrimination. 
(She does not explicitly state here what the true motivation might be, but she implies that 
it is a fear of Islam.) This is troubling, Nussbaum thinks, because religious discrimination 
is inappropriate in liberal societies, which promote religious tolerance. 
                                                
6 See Steven Erlanger, “France: Senate Passes Bill on Facial Veils,” New York Times, September 15, 2010, 
accessed January 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/15/world/europe/15briefs-France.html; and 
Steven Erlanger, “France Enforces Ban on Full-Face Veils in Public,” New York Times, April 12, 2011, 
accessed January 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/12/world/europe/12france.html. 
7 See BBC News, “Barcelona to Ban Islamic Veils in Some Public Spaces,” last modified June 15, 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10316696. 
8 See Martha Nussbaum, “Veiled Threats?” last modified July 11, 2010, 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/11/veiled-threats. All the quotes in the discussion of 
Nussbaum’s piece are from here. 
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The first argument that Nussbaum raises is “that security requires people to show 
their faces when appearing in public places.” The second is “that the kind of transparency 
and reciprocity proper to relations between citizens is impeded by covering part of the 
face.” She dismisses both of these arguments as unserious, primarily on the grounds that 
they discriminate against Islam because they are applied inconsistently. In other words, 
the movements to ban the veil have not also called for a ban on other types of face 
coverings (winter scarves, helmets, hoods, and so forth). Clearly the veil is being targeted 
here, which Nussbaum views as a form of religious discrimination. 
The third argument is “that the burqa is a symbol of male domination that 
symbolizes the objectification of women (that they are being seen as mere objects).” She 
rejects this argument as well, first by pointing out that it is not clear that the burqa really 
is always a symbol of male domination. Some women might truly wish to wear the burqa: 
for some, it could be a sign of female empowerment, rather than male domination. Her 
second point against the argument is that, if the real concern is the objectification of 
women, then a number of other practices would have to be banned as well (she mentions 
“sex magazines, nude photos, tight jeans,” and “plastic surgery”). Again, Nussbaum 
claims that the burqa is being targeted here not for its oppressiveness, but because of its 
association with Islam, and this amounts to religious discrimination. 
The fourth argument, related to the third, is “that women wear the burqa only 
because they are coerced.” Her response to this argument is that coercion is already 
prohibited in the places where these laws have been proposed or enacted by laws against 
domestic abuse; and that this argument is usually made in ignorance of the actual 
situation of those wearing the burqa. Again, how do we know that all the women wearing 
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the burqa have been coerced into doing so? If coercion is the concern, then laws against 
abuse need to be better enforced across the board, and we must be sure that those wearing 
the burqa have indeed been coerced into doing so. Once again, Nussbaum’s point is that a 
practice associated with Islam is being targeted here, and this amounts to religious 
discrimination. 
The final argument that Nussbaum mentions is that the burqa is “unhealthy,” 
because it is “hot and uncomfortable.” She rejects this argument easily: is the proposal 
really to ban all clothing that makes people hot or uncomfortable? 
Nussbaum’s major point in raising (and rejecting) these arguments is to show that 
the proposals to ban full-face coverings are in fact meant to discriminate against a 
practice that is specifically associated with Islam, despite the reasons that are typically 
given. If those making the proposals were truly concerned with security, or 
objectification, then there are numerous other practices that would have to be prohibited 
in public alongside the full-face coverings. Since nobody is seriously proposing to ban 
these other practices, then the concern must in fact be with the Islamic practice of the 
full-face covering itself. Nussbaum claims that this is a form of discrimination targeted 
specifically at Islam. 
Why would those proposing these bans want to discriminate against Islam? As I 
stated earlier, Nussbaum does not answer this question directly in her piece, but the 
implication is that there must be hidden reasons for wanting to ban full-face coverings in 
public places; the reasons that are actually given must not be serious, since they are not 
being applied consistently. I will return to the issue of what these reasons might be after I 
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have considered another source of tension between Islam and the West that has lately 
risen in prominence: the construction of mosques in Western countries. 
As mentioned previously, in 2009, through a public referendum, Switzerland 
enacted a ban on the construction of minarets, a typical architectural feature in mosques: 
tall towers from which the call to prayer is traditionally made.9 Also, in the summer of 
2010, in the U.S., protests arose over plans to build an Islamic cultural center, which 
would include a space that could be used as a mosque, two blocks away from ground 
zero, the site of the 9/11 attacks that brought down the World Trade Center.10 The issue 
received a considerable amount of media attention, which spread to cover concerns in 
other parts of the U.S. about the building of mosques. 
What reasons are given to support these movements limiting the construction of 
mosques? In Switzerland, a campaign poster in favor of the ban “depicted a Swiss flag 
sprouting black, missile-shaped minarets alongside a woman shrouded in a niqab, a head-
to-toe veil that shows only the eyes, starkly illustrated the determination of the right to 
play on deep-rooted fears that Muslim immigration would lead to an erosion of Swiss 
values.”11 A far-right member of the Swiss Parliament claimed that the minarets 
symbolized “the political will to take power,” which would then be used to establish 
Islamic law in the country. 
As for the U.S., the protests surrounding the so-called “ground zero mosque” give 
expression to the claim that it is disrespectful to build an Islamic community center so 
                                                
9 See Erlanger, “Swiss Ban Building of Minarets on Mosques.” Note, however, that none of the Swiss 
minarets actually give a call to prayer. 
10 See New York Times, “Muslim Community Center in Lower Manhattan (Park51),” last modified August 
3, 2011, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/p/park51/index.html. 
11 Erlanger, “Swiss Ban Building of Minarets on Mosques.” 
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close to the site of a tragedy perpetrated by Muslims. The project, which is known as 
Cordoba House, was first presented in public on May 5, 2010, and protests began to 
emerge the next day. Certain notable conservative figures have spoken out regarding the 
project. Sarah Palin, for instance, called it an “unnecessary provocation,” and 
(in)famously urged Muslims to “refudiate” it. Newt Gingrich, the former House Speaker 
who is currently running for President in 2012, has opposed the project as well, calling it 
“an aggressive act that is offensive.”12 The Anti-Defamation League also opposes the 
project, even though they have criticized anti-Islamic attitudes in the past. Its national 
director, Abraham H. Foxman, said the location was “the wrong place,” noting that its 
proximity to the site of the 9/11 attacks makes it an affront to those families who lost 
loved ones in the attacks.13 These points might be valid if those who are proposing to 
build the Islamic community center were affiliated with Al Qaeda, which was behind the 
9/11 attacks, or even if they sympathized with the attackers. 
However, this is not the case. The man who would lead the center is Feisal Abdul 
Rauf, an imam who has led a mosque in New York’s financial district for over twenty 
years. He “always emphasizes the center’s interfaith agenda.”14 In an opinion piece in the 
New York Times on September 7, 2010, Rauf mentions that he has delivered speeches 
internationally promoting interfaith relations, and he has also served as a representative 
on a U.S. State Department tour of the Middle East. He says, “My life’s work has been 
                                                
12 See Michael Barbaro, “Debate Heats up About Mosque near Ground Zero,” New York Times, July 31, 
2010, accessed January 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/31/nyregion/31mosque.html. 
13 Ibid. 
14 See Stolberg, Sheryl Gay, “Obama Enters Debate with Mosque Remarks,” New York Times, August 15, 
2010, accessed January 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/15/us/politics/15mosque.html. 
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focused on building bridges between religious groups.”15 The name of the center, 
Cordoba House, is based on the name of his initiative, the Cordoba Initiative, which 
refers to “the city in Spain where Muslims, Christians and Jews co-existed in the Middle 
Ages during a period of great cultural enrichment created by Muslims.” The initiative, he 
says, “is intended to cultivate understanding among all religions and cultures.” 
Furthermore, Rauf describes the “broader mission” of the initiative: “to strengthen 
relations between the Western and Muslim worlds and to help counter radical ideology.” 
Cordoba House would include prayers spaces for many faiths and a multifaith 9/11 
memorial. Unless Rauf is being completely disingenuous, and there is no reason to think 
this, then he is clearly no radical Muslim. He sees Cordoba House as a way to 
commemorate the victims of 9/11, not the attackers. 
The outcry against the center has led others to defend it, such as Mayor Michael 
R. Bloomberg of New York City, and even President Barack Obama, both of whom have 
claimed that religious freedom allows for religious groups to build centers without 
government interference. The center has also received support from other Muslims. For 
instance, on September 20, 2010, a group of Muslim leaders gathered at the proposed site 
of Cordoba House to pledge their support to the center, focusing on their constitutional 
right to build a center at the location. More importantly, it has received support from 
members of other faiths: Christian, Jewish, and Muslim leaders joined together at an 
“emergency summit” on September 7, 2010, to express their disapproval of the “‘anti-
Muslim frenzy’ and attacks at several mosques” which they said “had the potential not 
                                                
15 See Feisal Abdul Rauf, “Building on Faith,” New York Times, September 8, 2010, accessed January 21, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/08/opinion/08mosque.html. All the quotes in this paragraph come 
from this piece. 
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only to tear apart the country, but also to undermine the reputation of America as a model 
of religious freedom and diversity.”16 Despite all of this, a poll performed from 
September 16-20, 2010, found that, while 80 percent of the New York respondents 
believed that the Cordoba Initiative had a right to build the community center at its 
proposed location, 57 percent found the location to be inappropriate, seemingly because 
they find the location to be insensitive to the families of victims of the 9/11 attacks.17 
Again, though, Imam Rauf (and in fact the vast majority of American Muslims) clearly 
does not associate or sympathize with the attackers. 
It appears that the root cause of the concerns over the presence of the veil and the 
mosque in the West is a misunderstanding of Islam that leads to a fear that the presence 
of Muslims in Western countries will lead to the disintegration of Western values. The 
key misunderstanding is the equation of Islam as a whole with the Islam of the oppressive 
Muslims who carry out terrorist attacks, such as those on 9/11. This misunderstanding 
then leads to a fear of anything associated with Islam, or “Islamophobia,” with the idea 
being that Islamic values are necessarily antithetical to the values that are seen as being 
so central to Western identity, such as individual freedoms. The integration of Muslims 
into Western society in general is thus seen as problematic. The Swiss propaganda 
regarding the minarets demonstrates this, as does the French ban on full-face coverings. 
Recent developments in Germany show this as well. Thilo Sarrazin, a banker, recently 
published a book, the title of which can be translated as Germany Does Away With Itself, 
“which laments the growing number of Muslim immigrants, contending that they are 
                                                
16 See Laurie Goodstein, “Concern Is Voiced over Religious Intolerance,” New York Times, September 8, 
2010, accessed January 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/08/us/08muslim.html. 
17 See Reuters, “NY Voters Support Right to Build Muslim Center – Poll,” last modified September 24, 
2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2420267120100924. 
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‘dumbing down’ society.”18 Sarrazin has resigned from his post with the German central 
bank, but his views have gained some traction in Germany: as of November 2010, his 
book had sold more than a million copies. 
While it might be true that some of those who would identify as Muslims, such as 
the Taliban, do indeed place a low value on individual freedoms, it is mistaken to 
attribute this view to Islam as a whole. One step toward dispelling the fear of Muslim 
immigration to the West is to demonstrate that this equation of Islamic values as a whole 
with the values of a relatively small group of fundamentalist Muslims is false: even if 
Islamic values are not the same as Western values, they may not clash as much as this 
equation allows. At the same time, it is important to note that there are indeed key 
differences between Islamic and liberal values, as we will see when we compare forms of 
Islamic education to Harry Brighouse’s proposal for autonomy-facilitating education. 
 
The Place of Islamic Education in Liberal Pluralist Societies 
While Islamophobia could be the result of an overreaction to the differences 
between Islamic and liberal values based on sweeping generalizations about Islam, 
complete harmony between Islamic and liberal values is unlikely. Liberal democracies, 
with their concurrent openness to pluralism and valuing of personal autonomy, must have 
strategies for addressing the differences that do exist. At this point, I narrow my focus to 
how this impacts decisions regarding educational policy. Specifically, I will examine a 
central concern in the literature on religious education: the compatibility between the 
foundations of forms of religious education and the demands of education in liberal 
                                                
18 See Michael Slackman, “Book Sets off Immigration Debate in Germany,” New York Times, September 3, 
2010, accessed January 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/03/world/europe/03germany.html. 
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pluralistic societies. I will introduce this literature by focusing on one recent 
representative work: Walter Feinberg’s For Goodness Sake: Religious Schools and 
Education for Democratic Citizenry.19 While Feinberg discusses religious education 
generally, it will be clear how the issues he raises apply to Islamic education specifically. 
In For Goodness Sake, Feinberg aims “to open up a dialogue about the 
appropriate aims of religious education and about the teaching of religion in liberal, 
democratic societies.”20 He states that his “thesis is that the public has a strong interest in 
the work of religious schools and that this interest extends beyond the academic 
performance of their students into the shared moral understanding required to sustain and 
reproduce liberal, pluralistic democracies.”21 Underlying this thesis is Feinberg’s concern 
“with the practices of religious schools and with the extent to which they may develop 
the critical reflective skills and the attitude of respect for differences that democracy 
requires.”22 This is a concern because “religion constitutes a new imperative for 
education [that] must be taken seriously in its own right,” but it is not immediately clear 
“how to do that in the context of competing religious truth claims and without sacrificing 
the commitment of liberal democracy to critical thinking and autonomy,” which is a 
dilemma Feinberg intends to resolve in his book by discussing “how to engage belief in 
such a way that the capacity for critical reflection is nurtured.”23 
                                                
19 Walter Feinberg, For Goodness Sake: Religious Schools and Education for Democratic Citizenry (New 
York: Routledge, 2006). 
20 Ibid., xi. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., xiv. 
23 Ibid., xv, xix. 
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As we will see in Chapter 3, critical reflection is a central component of the 
development of personal autonomy. Autonomy cannot be exercised without this capacity. 
However, as Feinberg notes, religious morality “is associated with a set of rules, 
principles, and virtues that from the inside appear divine but from the outside sometimes 
appear dogmatic and inflexible.”24 In other words, religious morality is typically 
associated with the hindrance of autonomy, not its facilitation. At the same time, liberal 
democracies are generally committed to pluralism, which aims to “allow a ‘thousand 
flowers to bloom.’”25 A person committed to pluralism would tend to support the 
flourishing of religious schools, but a person committed to liberalism would not want this 
flourishing to extend to forms of education that hinder the development of critical 
reflection and autonomy. What should the person do who is committed to both? There is 
thus a tension built in to the liberal pluralist democracy on which most Western countries 
are based, and religious education highlights this tension particularly well. 
Feinberg addresses this tension with the following argument: first, “ideally, 
congregants have prima facie reason to ask that citizens respect their religious identity 
and their right to advance that identity in their children.”26 Second, “citizens [of liberal 
pluralist societies] have reason to ask that religious education respect the fundamental 
requirements of liberal pluralism, requirements that include a reasonable degree of 
individual autonomy, public participation, political stability under just conditions, and 
intellectual development.”27 
                                                
24 Ibid., xviii. 
25 Ibid., xx. 
26 Ibid., xxiv. 
27 Ibid. 
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My dissertation contributes to this line of thinking by proposing a way that 
Islamic schools can in fact include a reasonable degree of individual autonomy. I will 
represent Islamic schools by examining three forms of Islamic education, which between 
them offer two different ways of understanding what such an education should entail. I 
will represent an education for autonomy with Harry Brighouse’s autonomy-facilitating 
education. Feinberg’s discussion in his book focuses primarily on Catholic schools, with 
references to Jewish and Lutheran schools, but Islamic education plays a relatively small 
direct role in his analysis. Few philosophers of education writing in English have 
examined the foundations of Islamic education and their possible compatibility with 
liberal educational foundations. One of those who have is Michael Merry, who has 
analyzed the role of Islamic education in liberal pluralistic democracies in his book, 
Culture, Identity, and Islamic Schooling: A Philosophical Approach.28 While autonomy 
does play a role in Merry’s analysis, my work differs from his in that it focuses on 
particular examples of Islamic education (Merry develops an “ideal type” of Islamic 
education) and uses, as a baseline for comparison, a specific liberal proposal for 
autonomy-facilitating education. In addition, I will suggest a specific curriculum, which I 
call Worldview Education, that could serve as a form of autonomy-facilitating education 
in Islamic schools. I will now explain the chapter-by-chapter approach I will use to 
undertake this project. 
 
Chapter Outline 
                                                
28 Michael S. Merry, Culture, Identity, and Islamic Schooling: A Philosophical Approach (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
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In Chapter 2, I discuss three forms of Islamic education: the first is the Muslim 
scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s major writing on Islamic education, based on my English 
translation of his work from the original Arabic.29 The second is based on a discussion of 
Universal School in Bridgeview, Illinois, and the third is the College Preparatory School 
of America in Lombard, Illinois. My aim in Chapter 2 is to present a limited survey of 
forms of Islamic education that reveal two broad approaches, which, while including 
material beyond the teaching of Islam, is always tempered with a concern to maintain the 
integrity of the religion. 
In Chapter 3, I use the work of David Johnston and Harry Brighouse on personal 
autonomy and autonomy-facilitating education, respectively, in order to establish a 
typical liberal view of the role of the development of autonomy in education. This view 
will serve as a “template” of what an education for autonomy would look like. In Chapter 
4, I will use a discussion of a fundamental difference between Islamic and liberal 
worldviews — a focus on submission versus a focus on autonomy — in order to reveal 
the concerns that Brighouse’s proposal for an autonomy-facilitating education raises 
within the context of Islamic education. I then suggest a modification of Brighouse’s 
proposal — Worldview Education — that can serve as the basis for a kind of education 
for autonomy that would be acceptable to some Islamic schools. 
In Chapter 5, I expand on my proposal for Worldview Education by describing in 
more detail how such a curriculum would work in an Islamic secondary school covering 
grades 9-12. I present three forms that Worldview Education could take: a four-year 
curriculum, a one-year curriculum in grade 12, and an integrated approach in which 
                                                
29 To my knowledge, Qaradawi’s book on education has yet to be published in an English translation. 
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aspects of Worldview Education are incorporated into already existing parts of the 
curriculum. I also raise two major practical concerns that would have to be addressed for 
Worldview Education to become a reality, especially in the U.S., namely a dearth of 
qualified teachers and a lack of teaching resources geared toward high school students. 
However, I suggest ways in which these concerns might be addressed by turning to work 
that has already been done, both in the U.S. and in Western Europe, on effective practices 
for teaching about religion. I conclude the chapter by commenting on the need for 
something like Worldview Education in all schools, Islamic and otherwise, on the 
grounds of both facilitating autonomy and engaging students with worldviews that they 
are increasingly likely to come into contact with in an increasingly connected world.  
In the end, I hope to show how a comparative study of educational proposals 
rooted in worldviews with different core values — in this case, three forms of Islamic 
education and Brighouse’s autonomy-facilitating education — can help us to focus on the 
issues that are relevant to determining the extent to which Islamic education could remain 
true to Islam while also supporting one of what Feinberg calls the fundamental 
requirements of liberal pluralism: a reasonable degree of individual autonomy. 
  




THREE EXAMPLES OF ISLAMIC EDUCATION 
Before I can explore the concerns that Harry Brighouse’s proposal for autonomy-
facilitating education raises for Islamic schools, I first want to offer some examples of 
what Islamic education looks like, in addition to a description of Brighouse’s proposal. In 
this chapter, I focus on Islamic education. Submission to the will of God is central to the 
Islamic understanding of what a good human life entails. Accordingly, a central aim of 
any form of Islamic education is to facilitate students’ submission. However, within 
Islam, there are a variety of interpretations of what exactly it means to submit to God’s 
will. Contemporary thinking on Islamic education reflects this diversity, as we will see in 
this chapter. 
What follows is not a comprehensive review of contemporary Islamic educational 
thought and practice; such a project would require its own dissertation. Instead, I focus on 
a limited number of examples that represent the diversity of Islamic understandings of 
what it means to submit to God — what it means for a person to lead a good life. I first 
discuss the educational proposal of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a prominent Muslim religious 
scholar, who wants to promote a particular vision of Islam that is rooted in tradition and 
solidly protected against certain challenges of modernity. I then discuss Universal School 
in Bridgeview, Illinois, and the College Preparatory School of America in Lombard, 
Illinois. Both of these schools have adopted forms of Islamic education that focus more 
on providing an education within an Islamic environment that can prepare students for 
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college than on inculcating a particular interpretation of Islam. Again, the point is to 
show that there is disagreement among Islamic educators regarding the implementation 
of the central aim of Islamic education: submission to the will of God. We must take this 
disagreement into account when we consider how Islamic schools can provide an Islamic 
education that also allows for a reasonable degree of individual autonomy. In what 
follows, I will have more to say about Qaradawi’s proposal than about the Illinois school, 
since Qaradawi’s proposal is not available in English, while information about the Illinois 
schools is more readily accessible. 
My discussion of Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s conception of Islamic education is focused 
on one particular work, which was published in 1979 as al-tarbiyah al-islamiyah wa 
madrasat Hassan al-Banna [Islamic Education and the Schools of Hassan al-Banna].1 In 
this work, which runs to roughly 100 pages in Arabic, Qaradawi describes how the 
Muslim Brotherhood, especially during the leadership of its founder Hassan al-Banna, 
understood Islamic education. The Muslim Brotherhood, which has played a central role 
in the democratic uprisings in Egypt, is an Islamist movement that originally arose in 
1928 as a response to the British occupation of Egypt.2 Qaradawi himself is a Muslim 
religious scholar, born in Egypt in 1926, who is generally recognized as a leading 
authority of Islamic law among Sunni Muslims. He has been described as a “global 
mufti,” in the sense that he has used media such as satellite television and the Internet to 
                                                
1 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, al-tarbiyah al-islamiyah wa madrasat Hassan al-Banna [Islamic Education and the 
Schools of Hassan al-Banna] (Cario: Maktabat Wahbah, 1979). For the remainder of my discussion of 
Qaradawi’s proposal, references to page numbers in the text will refer to this book. 
2 Two helpful discussions of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is also sometimes called the Muslim Brothers, 
are Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (London: Oxford University Press, 1969); and 
Brynjar Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1998). 
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expand the reach of his understanding of Islam to Muslims around the world.3 Qaradawi 
was formally associated with the group early in his life, though his current associations 
with the group are largely unofficial. Nevertheless, Qaradawi is still viewed as a spiritual 
leader by members of the Muslim Brotherhood, in addition to many Muslims, especially 
among Egyptians. 
Qaradawi devotes al-tarbiyah al-islamiyah wa madrasat Hassan al-Banna to an 
elaboration of the Brotherhood’s form of education as a way of propagating and 
endorsing its views on what a proper Islamic education entails. Before summarizing 
Qaradawi’s discussion, I should note that my interpretation is based on my own English 
translation of Qaradawi’s work, since it has not been formally translated into English. In 
working through my translation, my aim has been to produce a rough translation, one that 
captures the main ideas of the book while perhaps not capturing every stylistic flourish. 
Therefore, when I quote the book, I will be quoting my rough translation. 
Qaradawi begins the book with a brief preface in which he describes the 
postcolonial situation of the umma.4 Even though the majority Muslim states have gained 
political independence, he believes that the Western influence that permeated these states 
through colonial occupation has led to the deterioration of the umma. The umma thus 
faces a crisis, having lost much of its strength through the weakening of its foundations 
that came with colonialism. In general, Qaradawi’s work has been deeply concerned with 
how the umma should respond to threats, and it is this concern that motivates this book as 
                                                
3 For much more on the life and work of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, see Bettina Gräf and Jakob Skovgaard-
Petersen, eds., Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Yusuf al-Qaradawi (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2009). 
4 Umma is a term that refers to the worldwide community of Muslims. Different groups of Muslims have 
differing ideas about who should properly be included in the umma. 
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well. The ultimate aim of the book, then, is to describe one way that the Muslim 
Brotherhood responded to such threats, which focused on the renewal of the umma 
through its youth. If the youth received a proper Islamic education, then they would 
become agents in the restoration of the umma, and in this book Qaradawi describes what 
this education should entail. 
The Brotherhood’s model of Islamic education is successful, he thinks, for six 
reasons: 
1. It is based on the firm conviction that the best way to restore the umma is 
through education. A model based on such a firm conviction has extra force. 
2. It is clearly laid out, so it would be relatively easy to establish Islamic schools 
based on this model. 
3. It is based on a view that Muslims are stronger when they stand together, 
meaning that the model aims to instill the importance of the cohesion of the umma itself, 
if Islam is to remain a force in the contemporary world. 
4. It is based on a view that the heart of the educator is what is most important if 
he is to speak the truth about Islam, since true teachings come from the heart. The idea 
here is that the model is to be implemented by educators who truly believe in Islam in 
their hearts, which lends soundness to the Islamic character of the education. 
5. It has been implemented for two generations, with some of those who were 
students in the first generation become educators in the second. The model clearly has 
staying power, and is strengthened by a continuity that comes from having educators who 
themselves were educated by the model. 
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6. It promotes a variety of educational methods, some of which are meant to build 
strength within the family, some of which are meant to build strength within the 
community, and some of which are designed to form the Muslim individual. The model 
therefore promotes a form of education that goes beyond traditional “schooling” in it 
comprehensiveness. 
This last point is of particular importance for Qaradawi, because he believes that 
education must be adapted to serve various purposes. According to Qaradawi, Islamic 
education should not be grounded in the traditional route of memorization and recitation, 
instilling only a rote understanding of Islam; instead it should be an education that is 
grounded in a variety of methods that promote a passion for Islam. The Muslim who 
Qaradawi wants to produce is one for whom Islam ignites the will not only to resist 
outside forces (such as Western ideas), but also to change the world actively according to 
God’s commands, both by spreading God’s message throughout the world and 
establishing an Islamic civilization that unites the umma. In Qaradawi’s view, God has 
already provided the umma with the tools to establish an Islamic civilization that 
preserves human dignity, and Islamic education should draw from this toolbox in order to 
produce a Muslim who is able to further this goal. This, Qaradawi says, was the primary 
task of the Brotherhood, and they understood that education was the foundation of this 
mission. In particular, this goal would be achieved through an education characterized by 
an emphasis on spirituality, comprehensiveness, moderation, brotherhood, excellence, 
and independence. Much of Qaradawi’s book is therefore taken up with how the 
Brotherhood’s program of Islamic education implemented these characteristics. 
After establishing the overall aim of the “schools of Hassan al-Banna,” which he 
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endorses as the aim of Islamic education generally, Qaradawi begins to explore in some 
detail the various aspects of the Brotherhood’s philosophy of Islamic education. He 
begins with what he calls the “spiritual” aspect of the Brotherhood’s program of 
education. He starts here because he believes that it is the most important aspect of this 
education, and that it is the primary aim of Islamic education generally, since it is the 
aspect concerned with forming believers. Faith imbued the entire lives of the early 
Muslims, according to Qaradawi: “The Companions and those among their followers 
who made up the ancestors of the umma…imbued their entire lives with faith, in the 
mosque, in the home, and in society.”5 (9) This is the message that the Brotherhood tries 
to get across in its educational program, and faith therefore serves both as Islamic 
education’s driving force and primary aim. Qaradawi focuses especially on the 
connection of faith to the “living heart.” (10) The core of a person is not his physical 
form, according to Qaradawi, but rather the “divine spark” that animates his entire being. 
(10) It is this “divine spark,” associated with the “living heart,” that truly connects a 
person to God. The living heart is where a person beholds God and it is the heart that is 
presented to God on the Day of Judgment. He supports this point with numerous 
Qur’anic references that associate unbelief with the hardening of the heart.6 When a 
                                                
5 “Companions” is a reference to the companions of Muhammad, those who were part of his inner circle in 
Medina. Muhammad is the central Prophet of Islam whose life and teachings, based on his propagation of 
the Muslim holy book, the Qur’an, are authoritative for many Muslims. “Ancestors” is a reference to the 
first three generations of Muslims, who are seen as particularly exemplary, due to their close connection to 
the years in which Muhammad established the umma. In general, Islam as practiced by the Companions 
and the ancestors (sometimes called the “pious ancestors”) is seen as the Islamic ideal, because it is seen as 
representing the Islam that God wished to establish on earth through Muhammad’s work. 
6 “They broke their covenant and we made their hearts hard.” (Qur’an 5:13) “Then your hearts were 
hardened after that so they were like stones or the most severe hardness.” (Qur’an 2:74) “Is the time not 
arrived for those who believe to make humble their hearts for the memory of God and the truth he brought 
down and not to be like those who received the Book before so the duration was extended for them and 
their hearts were hardened?” (Qur’an 57:16) These translations of the Qur’an, along with the others used in 
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person acts against God, his heart is hardened; but when a person is connected to God, his 
heart is enlivened: he has a “living heart.” 
The turning of the heart toward material desires that results from a love of the 
world is the greatest danger that the believer faces, according to Qaradawi. As the Qur’an 
says: “Is not he who is most astray he who follows his passions and not the righteous path 
of God?”7 Material desires can include carnal desires like gluttony and lust, but they also 
include desires for fame, glory, wealth, and public adulation. Qaradawi describes these 
desires as a “killing epidemic,” in line with Ghazali’s (d. 1111) description of these 
desires as “the deadly things,” which Ghazali based on a Hadith which states that there 
are “three deadly things: stinginess...passion...and conceit.”8 (12) 
Qaradawi notes that many people believe that the way to control these material 
desires is through prohibiting oneself from engaging in “deadly” actions such as theft, 
adultery, and alcohol. But these actions are in fact less dangerous than the true source of 
these desires: a “psychological disease” of not recognizing one’s own ignorance of the 
divine. (12) This is why the call to Islam, from day one, was focused on removing an 
ignorance of God and turning toward the divine. According to Qaradawi, prohibiting 
certain actions is like treating the symptoms of a disease without treating its cause. 
“Deadly” actions are symptoms of the disease, but the disease itself is caused by an 
ignorance of God.  
                                                                                                                                            
this chapter, are taken from Muhammad A.S. Abdel Haleem, trans., The Qur’an (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005). 
7 Qur’an 28:50. 
8 Ghazali is perhaps the best-known medieval Islamic scholar, whose works hold great authority for most 
Muslims. 
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It is this ignorance, then, from which education must protect the Muslim. This is 
why combating ignorance by promoting a turn toward the divine occupies such a large 
part in the Brotherhood’s curriculum. And Qaradawi believes that this turn toward the 
divine, as we have seen, occurs in the heart. Because the turn occurs in the heart, what 
matters is the sincerity that lies behind one’s actions, and not so much the actions 
themselves. As Qaradawi puts it: “[God] does not reward the volume of visible work, but 
the sincerity that is behind it.” (13) And while other people might have difficulty 
ascertaining the true motives that underlie a person’s actions, God easily recognizes 
hypocrisy, which Qaradawi calls the “hidden shirk.”9 (13) God does not love actions that 
are “shirk,” meaning that their aims are not directed solely toward Him. And actions that 
are “shirk” come from a heart that is “shirk.” As the Qur’an states: “Whoever hopes to 
meet his Lord must work sincerely and not ever share the worship of his Lord with 
anyone.”10 The faithful Muslim must therefore be directed solely toward God, according 
to Qaradawi. 
Protection of the heart is just one of the components of the spiritual aspect of 
Islamic education, on the Brotherhood’s model. The second of these components is 
nourishment of the heart, which is sustained, says Qaradawi, through the worship of God. 
Encouraging the proper worship of God is one of the foundational components of the 
Brotherhood’s education, just as it is primary for God, who says, “I did not create the jinn 
and humanity except to worship.”11 Generally, worship refers to all words and actions 
                                                
9 “Shirk,” which literally means “association” or “sharing,” is considered the gravest sin in Islam: the 
association of God with other divinities, or the sharing of one’s devotion to ideals other than God. 
10 Qur’an 18:110. 
11 Qur’an 51:56. 
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that please God, but Qaradawi says that he is going to discuss worship in a more general 
sense of “devotion and closeness to God.” (15) In other words, Qaradawi is not interested 
here in the actual practice of worship; rather, he is interested in detailing what we might 
call a “worshipful attitude” toward God, which, unsurprisingly, comes from the heart. 
So far, then, we have reviewed Qaradawi’s discussion of the “spiritual aspect” of 
the Brotherhood’s Islamic education, which occurs in the first chapter of his book. The 
second chapter of Qaradawi’s book is the lengthiest, dealing with the topic of 
“Integration and Thoroughness” in the Islamic education of the Muslim Brotherhood.12 
Qaradawi foregrounds his discussion of the spiritual aspect of the Brotherhood’s Islamic 
education in the first chapter of his book because he sees this as its “primary special 
feature”: without a base in Islamic faith, education cannot truly be Islamic. (24) However, 
beginning with this second chapter, Qaradawi aims to show that the Brotherhood’s 
program of Islamic education, while based throughout on Islamic principles, was 
concerned with more than just inculcating an Islamic faith. While Islamic education must 
be grounded in Islam, students are not expected to study Islam alone. 
By “integration and thoroughness,” Qaradawi means specifically to say that the 
Brotherhood’s Islamic education is concerned with every aspect of people, including their 
relationship with society, and not just with their development of faith. In addition to the 
previously discussed “spiritual” aspect, then, these other aspects include “the mystical 
and the moral,” “philosophy and the rational,” “the physical,” and “the social.” (23) The 
spiritual aspect focuses on the heart, the moral aspect focuses on proper behavior, the 
                                                
12 The title of this second chapter might also be translated as “Integration and Comprehensiveness.” Either 
way, the idea is that the Brothers aimed to provide a complete education. While this education is grounded 
in the “spiritual aspect,” faith is not its only topic of study. 
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rational aspect focuses on proper thinking, the physical aspect focuses on proper health, 
and the social aspect focuses on how a person should engage with society at all levels 
from the local to the global. For Qaradawi, this “integration and thoroughness” in Islamic 
education is appropriate, as it reflect the thoroughness found in Islam. 
Having explained generally how the Brotherhood’s Islamic education displays 
“integration and thoroughness” by addressing the individual and society 
comprehensively, Qaradawi proceeds through the aspects that contribute to its 
thoroughness: the rational aspect, the moral aspect, the physical aspect, the jihadist 
aspect,13 the social aspect, and the political aspect. I will now describe what each of these 
aspects entails in order to give a sense of the scope of the Muslim Brotherhood’s (and 
hence Qaradawi’s) vision of Islamic education. 
The “rational aspect” is a crucial aspect of Islamic education, for Qaradawi, 
because the development of rational thought is a crucial aspect of Islam. He supports this 
point by noting that the Qur’an contains numerous phrases that reflect a concern for 
reflection and understanding, such as the following: “Do you not understand?” “Do you 
not reflect?” “A mandate for the people is that they understand.” “The people must 
reflect.” “Foremost are those who contemplate.” “Foremost is the mind.”14 (24) 
Therefore, Qaradawi says, “reflection in Islam is an act of devotion” and “demanding 
knowledge is an obligation,” whereas “slavishly following precedent is a crime.” (24)  
Qaradawi says that understanding must precede faith because one who responds 
to the call of Islam should be able to provide accurate explanations of its sources, 
                                                
13 I will say more about what Qaradawi means by “jihadist” later in the chapter. 
14 Qaradawi does not provide specific references for these quotations. 
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especially the Qur’an, and correct others’ misconceptions regarding its content and 
interpretation. This understanding therefore not only helps the individual in his own faith, 
but can be used to teach others about Islam as well. For instance, Qaradawi notes that 
explanations of the Qur’an, and responses to misconceptions about it, can be spread 
among the larger Muslim community through media such as writing and radio.15 The 
fundamental point, though, is that understanding is the foundation of a “Muslim mentality 
that understands religion and life correctly.” (25) The Muslim with understanding is able 
to properly comprehend doctrine, proper worship, and God’s law. Without understanding, 
however, none of this is possible. The “rational aspect” in the Brotherhood’s educational 
program is thus of great importance, according to Qaradawi, since one cannot live a truly 
Islamic life without it. 
But Qaradawi gives another reason for the importance of the rational aspect, 
which extends beyond its connection to the spiritual aspect of Islamic education. The 
Brother should not only understand the faith, but he should also be able to “understand 
life around him: How does it pass? How does it transform? How is it influenced? And 
what are the forces that drive, transform, and influence it?” (26) In other words, the 
Muslim must understand not only his religion, but also the workings of the world around 
him. Qaradawi makes clear that he is not just talking about a person’s immediate 
surroundings, or local community. This is where the Brother’s focus begins, but it must 
gradually expand to encompass the entire world: “It is necessary that the Brother begins 
with knowledge of the small society in which he lives, like the village or the city. Then 
                                                
15 Even in 1979, Qaradawi shows an interest in using mass media to spread proper teachings about Islam. 
His more recent work connected to al-Jazeera and islamonline.net is simply an extension of this 
longstanding interest. 
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he proceeds to knowledge of the wider society [the geography and politics of his 
homeland], then to the great homeland — the Arab homeland — from the [Persian] Gulf 
to the [Mediterranean] Sea, and then to the greatest homeland, from Ocean to Ocean, 
which is the Islamic homeland.” (26) The ultimate goal, then, is for Muslims to be able to 
understand the forces that impact their lives on both a local and a global scale. 
This understanding of the forces that impact the Muslim’s life must include an 
understanding of the negative forces, or threats, that work both inside and outside of 
Islam. Specifically, Qaradawi mentions Zionists, Crusaders, Communists, secularists, 
idolaters, imitators, the hateful, and utilitarians, all of whom he says “worship the 
material and are slaves of positions of power.”16 (26) This idea, that there are forces both 
inside and outside of Islam that threaten it, and must be defended against, is one that will 
appear time and time again throughout the book. It is clear that preparing Muslims to 
protect their religion is one of the key themes of the education of the Brotherhood, as 
Qaradawi describes it.17 
After explaining the “rational aspect” of the Brotherhood’s education, which 
emphasizes both a proper understanding of the Qur’an and the Sunna and a proper 
understanding of the variety of forces that impact Muslim lives, Qaradawi turns to its 
“moral aspect,” the importance of which he says stems from its role as “the primary 
center of social transformation.” (30) Qaradawi references a saying of Hassan al-Banna’s 
                                                
16 By “imitators,” Qaradawi is likely referring to those within the umma who attempt to imitate Western 
values. The upshot of this list, however, is that Qaradawi views any way of life that is not directed solely 
toward God — that focuses, for instance, on a “love of the world” and a concern for power — as a negative 
force that threatens Islam.  
17 This concern will be fleshed out when we come to Qaradawi’s discussion of the “jihadist” aspect of the 
schools of Hassan al-Banna. Note that what exactly Qaradawi means by “jihad” will be explained as well. 
  30 
in support of this point: “The crisis of the world is but a crisis of the selves and the 
conscience before it is a crisis of economy and politics.” (30) For the Brotherhood, 
morality consisted primarily of having a virtuous character. Qaradawi emphasizes that 
virtue is not limited to the avoidance of certain things, such as gambling, intoxicants, and 
idolatry. Rather, virtue also includes various positive behaviors. Qaradawi discusses four 
positive virtues as having special importance: patience, persistence, hope, and solidarity. 
As Qaradawi describes it, the moral aspect of the schools of Hassan al-Banna 
emphasizes that the Muslim should persevere in devoting his life to Islam, always 
retaining hope in the ultimate uniting of the world as one umma under a Caliph, even in 
times of persecution or oppression, such as was felt under colonialism. Now we turn to 
Qaradawi’s discussion of the “physical aspect” of the Brotherhood’s education. This 
aspect is arguably the least relevant to our later analysis, but it is notable the extent to 
which Qaradawi uses Islamic principles to support even physical education. 
For Qaradawi, it is important to include physical education in the system of 
education, because a sound body is necessary to pursue the way of Islam effectively. He 
supports the importance of a concern for physical education with a Hadith that states: 
“Verily your body has a right over you.” (38) Respecting the body’s right over the 
individual is realized through three goals. First is physical health, which includes good 
hygiene, undergoing treatment when ill, and avoiding bad habits such as smoking. The 
second goal is physical strength, which is to be attained through physical activity and 
exercise. The third goal is to make the body resilient. The body must be able to endure a 
variety of conditions, such as heat and cold, and a variety of terrains, such as mountains 
and valleys. The point of all this is that the education of the mind is useless unless the 
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body that supports it is strong, and able to withstand the kinds of hardships that the 
Brother is likely to face (and did face, Qaradawi notes, “in the prisons and detention 
camps”).18 (39) 
Qaradawi now turns to what he calls the “jihadist aspect” of the educational 
program of the Brotherhood. Before describing this aspect, it is important to understand 
what Qaradawi means by “jihad.”19 The Arabic word can be literally translated into 
English as “struggle.” It can refer to a military struggle, but the word is also used to refer 
to an inner struggle that requires some kind of self-discipline. Qaradawi emphasizes that 
the understanding of jihad he has in mind is “deeper and more comprehensive than the 
military understanding” of the word. (39) In other words, he is not just talking about 
warfare here; he has in mind a broader understanding of jihad. This understanding of 
jihad involves “faith, morality, spirit, and solidarity, in addition to [the military 
understanding of] discipline and training.” (39) Hassan al-Banna considered jihad to be 
one of the 10 Allegiances, and a common slogan of the Brotherhood was “Jihad is our 
way, and death in the way of God is the height of our faith.” (40) Here, a military 
understanding of jihad is clearly meant. 
Qaradawi does acknowledge, however, that there is another aspect of jihad: “the 
jihad of the self.” (46) This struggle is directed against “Satan, who invades the person 
from inside by way of misconceptions that lead the mind astray, or feelings that seduce 
                                                
18 This is a reference to the arrests of members of the Brotherhood by the Egyptian government, which was 
discussed earlier in this chapter. Recall that Qaradawi himself spent time in a prison camp for his 
association with the Brotherhood. 
19 Throughout this discussion of the “jihadist aspect,” I will directly quote Qaradawi more often than I have 
when discussing the other aspects, since jihad is such a controversial topic, and I want to be sure that there 
is no doubt as to Qaradawi’s meaning. I should note, however, that Qaradawi’s understanding of jihad here 
is not necessarily controversial within Islamic thought. 
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the desires,” and the struggle itself consists of using “weapons of certainty that expel the 
misconceptions, and weapons of patience that defeat the misconceptions.” (47) This 
understanding of jihad is, Qaradawi writes, “the widest meaning of jihad in Islam, and it 
is — subsequently — the understanding of the Brotherhood, the education of the 
Brotherhood, and the behavior of the Brotherhood.” (47) The common feature to both the 
military understanding of jihad and the personal understanding of jihad is the idea of 
jihad as a struggle against invading forces, whether these forces are external, like foreign 
invaders, or internal, like temptations and doubt. 
After discussing the “jihadist aspect” of the schools of Hassan al-Banna, 
Qaradawi turns to its “social aspect.” This is the aspect of education concerned with the 
Brother’s engagement with the world, and Qaradawi describes it as having three 
components: one involving the Brother’s engagement with God in worship; one 
involving the Brother’s engagement with society through the provision of social services; 
and one involving the Brother’s engagement with “the enemy” through “jihad.” (49) 
Qaradawi goes into some detail about the first component when he discusses the 
“spiritual aspect” of Islamic education, and we have just reviewed his discussion of the 
third component through the “jihadist aspect.” As for how the Brother is to engage with 
society, it essentially involves supporting the umma in any way possible. Qaradawi 
mentions a number of services that the Brothers provided, including welfare, education, 
health care, and funerals. To attain these ends, the Brotherhood established centers 
throughout Egypt that organized the formation of health clinics and schools, provided 
charity and literacy classes, and built and repaired mosques and homes. 
After establishing the aspect of Islamic education that stresses the need to support 
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society, Qaradawi discusses the “political aspect.” By this, Qaradawi means not only a 
concern with the government of one’s own state, but also a concern with international 
relations. Prior to the rise of the Brotherhood, Qaradawi claims that religion and politics 
had become strictly divided in Islam. A man was “either a man of religion or a man of 
politics” and a group was “either a religious group or a political group.” (51) The Muslim 
Brotherhood, however, wanted to be both a religious group and a political group. As I 
discussed earlier with regard to Qaradawi’s attitude toward secularism, for the 
Brotherhood, Islam was to encompass every aspect of life, and the notion that Islam 
could be separated from politics was, in fact, un-Islamic. 
Qaradawi discusses three aims of political education. The first aim involves 
encouraging in people a desire to pursue complete independence for the nations of the 
umma. He contrasts this desire, with its focus on the global umma, with a concern for 
what he calls “narrow patriotism or fanatical nationalism.” (53) The second aim is to 
awaken in people a desire for the restoration of an Islamic government, most preferably 
under the control of a Caliph. Qaradawi contrasts this with “the humanistic philosophies 
and positivistic systems” introduced by the colonizers, which he describes collectively as 
a “disease” as a result of which the “individual lost self-contentment, the family lost its 
stability and interconnectedness, society lost its cohesion and its balance, and the whole 
world lost its security and its peace.” (57) The “treatment” for this disease is the 
“medicine” of Islam and, more specifically, “the establishment of the Islamic state.” (57) 
The third aim of political education, which is related to the first two aims, is to instill in 
people a desire to see the umma unified. The ultimate goal of the “political aspect” of the 
Islamic education of the Muslim Brotherhood, then, was to instill in people an awareness 
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of and a passion for the obligations not only to drive out any colonizing influences from 
the Islamic world, but also to strive for the unity of the Islamic world under one leader. 
Having proceeded through the various aspects of Islamic education in the eyes of 
the Brotherhood — rational, moral, physical, jihadist, social, and political — in order to 
demonstrate its comprehensiveness, Qaradawi devotes a chapter to “the positive and the 
constructive” elements of this education. Since this chapter repeats much of what we 
have already discussed, I will move on to the next chapter, which focuses on “moderation 
and balance,” or “middleness,” in the schools of Hassan al-Banna.20 (77) As Qaradawi 
describes it, the Brotherhood represents a “balance between mind and passion, the 
material and the spiritual, the ideal and the practical, the individual and society, 
consultation and obedience, rights and duties, and the old and the new.” (77) As has been 
discussed previously, this position led the Brotherhood to draw from many aspects of 
Islamic thought: from legal scholars it took a concern for the careful study of texts; from 
rhetoricians it took a concern for rational argument and challenging misconceptions; and 
from the Sufi scholars it took a concern for developing an inner connection to God 
through the heart. The Brotherhood did not accept all of these elements of Islamic 
thought uncritically, however. Instead, the Brotherhood aimed to sift through the various 
streams of thought in the heritage of Islam in order to discern that among them which 
accords with the Qur’an and the Sunna. The goal of this approach was to avoid “fervor 
and radicalism” in favor of a unified Islam based on moderation of the diverse elements 
in its heritage. (79) 
The final, brief chapter of Qaradawi’s book deals with “the Brothers and the 
                                                
20 Recall that a “middle way” approach to Islam is central to Qaradawi’s understanding of the faith. 
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community.” (93) The emphasis here is on the kind of relationship that those within the 
community should have with one another. In short, Qaradawi says that those within the 
Muslim community should perceive themselves as “children of one family, or members 
of one body.” (93) The implication of this is that all Muslims should be viewed as equal. 
All differences between Muslims, whether based on national origin, ethnicity, language, 
race, or class are to be erased, and nothing should remain except a common brotherhood 
within Islam. 
Qaradawi closes his book with a brief conclusion in which he emphasizes that, 
despite his advocacy of the Brotherhood’s educational program, he does not want to give 
the impression that all the Brothers were perfect. However, on the whole, Qaradawi does 
claim that the members of the Muslim Brotherhood were “examples of purity,” and hence 
are worthy of emulation. (99) And while the Brotherhood’s educational program has been 
successful for many years, according to Qaradawi, it is important to remain flexible: “it is 
not reasonable to keep everything that is old in the middle of a world which quickly 
transforms.” (100) 
What should we take, then, from Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s discussion of the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s view of Islamic education as we move forward? First, for Qaradawi, 
Islamic education is understood to be comprehensive, in the sense that it encompasses all 
aspects of life. Second, the foundations of Islamic education are the Qur’an and the 
Sunna, the two primary sources of Islam, and the key aims of Islamic education are 
supporting the Muslim community (the umma) and defending the place of Islam in the 
world against forces that are seen as threatening to the Islamic way of life. All aspects of 
the educational program are therefore justified with reference to their contributions to 
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aiding people’s understanding of the Qur’an and the Sunna, and leading people toward 
two heartfelt desires: First, to strengthen and purify the umma internally, through social 
services and purging Islam of forces that stray from the way of the Prophet and his 
Companions, respectively Second, to protect the umma from external forces such as 
colonialism (whether physical or cultural) and secularism, even to the extent of 
participating in military struggle, should it be necessary. Islamic education should 
therefore produce a Muslim who has a sound understanding of the Qur’an and the Sunna, 
and who uses that understanding as the basis of spreading the call to Islam locally, 
nationally, internationally, and globally. 
Qaradawi’s proposal is representative of what could be classified as a 
conservative, though not necessarily fundamentalist, view of Islamic education. He seems 
to envision it being introduced into predominantly Muslim countries. I now turn to views 
of Islamic education that have been implemented in the West. I use examples of 
contemporary Islamic educational thought and practice that are drawn from the literature 
on Islamic education available in English. One such example is found in a chapter by 
Barnaby B. Riedel in the book Just Schools, edited by Martha Minow, Richard A. 
Shweder, and Hazel Rose Markus.21 Riedel’s chapter focuses on an Islamic school in 
Chicago called Universal School. He chooses to study Universal School because it has 
adopted a character education curriculum known as Character Counts! This interests 
Riedel because Character Counts! has been adopted by a number of schools in the U.S., 
                                                
21 Barnaby B. Riedel. “Universal Particularism: Making an Ethical Islamic School in Chicago,” in Just 
Schools, eds. Martha Minow, Richard A. Shweder, and Hazel Rose Markus (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 2008). 
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both public and private. It is not an Islamic curriculum, yet it is being used as a curricular 
cornerstone in an Islamic school.22 
Universal School educates Muslims from a wide range of cultural backgrounds. 
As such, the school understands Islam “principally in terms of a system of universal 
values and ethics rather than, for instance, a common cultural heritage or a set of beliefs 
based on a revealed book.” (133) The Character Counts! curriculum allows Universal 
School to  rise above the “cultural and theological differences within the school” by 
focusing on a generalized view of virtue and good character. (134) 
Universal School was explicitly founded as an alternative to public education in 
the community of Bridgeview, which has become a focal point for Muslim immigration 
since the 1970s. These immigrants came from many areas in the Muslim world, such as 
Palestine, Egypt, Syria, Morocco, Sudan, India, and Pakistan. The story goes that the 
Universal School was founded after “the son of a Syrian doctor returned home from 
public school deeply disturbed, later explaining to his father that he had seen pictures of 
naked women covering the inside of another boy’s locker.” (138) This similarly disturbed 
the doctor, who gathered together support from Muslims in the area and around the 
country to start an Islamic school in Bridgeview. The school opened on September 4, 
1990, and it was accredited by the Illinois State Board of Education in 1992. It counts 
among “one of the largest pre-kindergarten through twelfth grade Islamic schools in the 
country, with over 600 students and 50 staff.” (138) 
The school does not claim to teach a particular form of Islam; rather, it aims to 
produce an Islamic environment. (141) This goal is achieved in various ways. There is a 
                                                
22 The website for Universal School is http://www.universalschool.org. References to Riedel’s discussion 
of Universal School will be given as page numbers throughout this section. 
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dress code: all students must have “regular haircuts” and “wear socks and closed-toe 
shoes.” Girls cannot wear makeup and boys cannot wear earrings. Older girls wear a 
hijab and calf-length navy-blue top; younger girls wear plaid skirts; and boys wear dress 
pants and collared shirts. (139) Students check into classes every morning in order to 
ensure attendance and maintenance of the dress code. They then head to the gym for 
prayer and announcements. At these times, the gym essentially becomes a mosque: shoes 
are removed, and students take positions on rugs that are oriented in such a way that 
students can face toward Mecca. The students arrange themselves on the rugs in a 
particular way, with men and women separated, arranged from oldest to youngest. An 
older male student then takes the role of imam, calling the group to prayer. A similar 
event happens for the afternoon prayer. 
The school is decorated with posters that have both Islamic and American themes, 
commemorating key events in both Islamic and American history. This contributes to the 
Islamic environment of the school. In addition to the dress codes and daily prayers, an 
Islamic environment is maintained through sex-segregated classes after fifth grade, a ban 
on flirting and dating among students, and halal food in the cafeteria. (141) The Islamic 
environment shows up in the curriculum through “classes relevant to the Islamic faith and 
the preservation of Muslim identity,” such as prayer instruction, Islamic studies, Islamic 
history, Arabic, and Qur’anic instruction. (141) Classes are taught in English, but Arabic 
is used to describe certain concepts and in expressions. There is a standard secular 
curriculum in place at the school, including Advanced Placement courses. While 
engagement with non-Islamic views would occur in courses on English, History, 
Geography, and Sociology, there are no classes explicitly devoted to other cultures or 
  39 
religions. Behavior is enforced “with reference to the Qur’an and the life of the Prophet, 
models of how to be good Muslims.” (144) 
It is important to note that the school has a familial environment, largely because 
all of the students are drawn from the close-knit Muslim community in Bridgeview. That 
being said, this community is not homogeneous: “While the student body is 
predominantly Palestinian (approximately 50 percent) and Syrian (nearly 20 percent), 
faculty and students come from families of Egyptian, Moroccan, Sudanese, African 
American, Indian, and Pakistani descent.” (145) Riedel notes that this poses a challenge 
for Universal School: “the difficulty of uniting a diversity of Muslims under the umbrella 
of a common Islam and a shared vision of Islamic education.” (145) Riedel argues that 
the Character Counts! curriculum is one way that Universal School addresses this 
difficulty, by providing a universalist ideal of good character that can transcend the 
cultural and theological differences present in the community. The key question here is 
how to provide an Islamic education when faculty, students, and the community have 
different ideas about what Islam teaches. 
Universal School claims to “teach Islam ‘just at the general level.’” (146) This 
means that there is not a robust Islamic curriculum at the school. Instead, Universal 
School focuses on preserving an Islamic environment. As Riedel points out, “The focus 
on creating an ‘environment’ rather than a ‘curriculum’ meets the challenge of diversity 
by leaving the question of Islamic education unstandardized and open-ended.” (149) This 
environment, implemented in ways that I have previously mentioned, allows Islam to 
pervade the school as “a system of value and ethics”: “Islamic education at Universal 
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School is about teaching students how to be good people, good Muslims, where the 
concept of ‘good’ is believed to be universal, transcendent, and self-evident.” (149) 
And yet, Riedel describes the value system promoted by Universal School as an 
“ethics of community,” where “the world is seen not as a collection of individuals but as 
a collection of groups.” (150) The focus of this ethics is preserving the integrity of the 
community, including the family. Riedel contrasts this ethics of community with an 
“ethics of autonomy,” where “the moral world is made up of individual human beings, 
and the purpose of moral regulation is to protect the discretionary choice of individuals.” 
(151) Rather than preserving the community, an ethics of autonomy aims to preserve the 
freedom of the individual. 
While the ethics of community is reinforced at Universal School with reference to 
the Qur’an and the life of the Prophet Muhammad, the values that the school promotes 
are not seen as particular to Islam. Instead, these values are seen as “being equivalent to 
‘American’ and ‘Western’ values.” (151) In fact, these values are viewed as universal. 
The ethics of community aligns neatly with the ethics held by the character education 
movement, including the Character Counts! curriculum, which began in 1992 and which 
Riedel describes as “possibly the most widely used character-education framework in the 
United States.” (153) It centers on “six pillars of character: trustworthiness, respect, 
responsibility, fairness, caring, and citizenship.” (153) 
Universal School uses Character Counts! as “a framework for Islamic moral 
pedagogy,” since the values coincide. The key difference between how the curriculum is 
implemented in a public school and how it is implemented in Universal School is that the 
Qur’an and the Hadith are used to reinforce the pillars of character. The citizenship pillar 
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is taught through community service opportunities and participation in the “Get Out the 
Vote” program. In a survey of Islamic school students, a vast majority supported the 
importance of voting, personal freedom, religious freedom, and the value of a secular 
government. Riedel notes that “the education at Universal School fits well with more 
conservative conceptions of American character that emphasize the centrality of religion 
in forging communal bonds, strengthening social responsibility, and promoting 
democratic values.” (156) This is seen, both by Universal School and the character 
education movement, as a contrast to “radical individualism, excessive freedom, and a 
lack of moral supervision,” which characterize public schools. (157) 
Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s educational proposal is an example of a conservative form 
of Islamic education, one that advances a particular interpretation of Islam. Universal 
School can be thought of as a more moderate version of Islamic education, with its more 
general focus on providing an Islamic environment without getting caught up in 
particular understandings of Islam. I now turn to a third Islamic school that could be 
characterized as moderate: College Preparatory School of America (CPSA) in Lombard, 
Illinois, a northwest suburb of Chicago.23 
The “vision” of CPSA could be shared by any college preparatory school: “To be 
a nationally recognized college preparatory school with outstanding faculty, state of the 
art facilities, and advanced curriculum to prepare our graduates for admission to top-
ranked colleges and be successful in their future endeavors.”24 Here is the remainder of 
CPSA’s vision: “We strive to foster a vibrant environment which ensures practice of 
                                                
23 The website of CPSA is http://www.cpsaonline.com. 
24 College Preparatory School of America, “About CPSA,” accessed January 21, 2012, 
http://www.cpsaonline.com/about-cpsa. 
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Islamic principles at all levels, and promotes cultural diversity, intellectual curiosity, 
creativity, entrepreneurship, leadership qualities, and service to humanity at large. We 
aim to produce professionally successful, and well-rounded individuals, who are enriched 
with knowledge, inspired to excellence, and committed to the betterment of family, 
community, and humanity.”25 Again, aside from the reference to Islamic principles, this 
could be any college prep school. 
The mission statement of CPSA is a little more explicit about the commitment to 
Islam: “[CPSA] is an academic institution dedicated to providing excellent education in 
an Islamic environment with Quran and Sunnah as its guiding principle.”26 The school 
was founded in 1991 “with a vision to provide a quality education in an Islamic 
environment.”27 It began as a high school with a population of 100 students, but has since 
expanded to include Pre-K through 12th grade and now educates over 400 students. 
CPSA emphasizes its rigorous curriculum -- college is clearly the goal for its students. 
The Elementary program at CPSA “stresses critical and abstract thinking processes” and 
this continues through to High School, which “emphasizes critical reading, research and 
writing, history and tradition, mathematical and technology skills, as well as scientific 
understanding.”28 The school offers Honors and AP courses and 99% of its graduates 
have been admitted to higher education. 
                                                
25 Ibid. 
26 College Preparatory School of America, “Mission Statement,” accessed January 21, 2012, 
http://www.cpsaonline.com/mission-statement. 
27 College Preparatory School of America, “History of CPSA,” accessed January 21, 2012, 
http://www.cpsaonline.com/history-of-cpsa. 
28 Ibid. 
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Islam does play an important role in the curriculum at CPSA: Students “learn 
Quranic Arabic, Sirah [the prophetic biographical tradition], and the principles of Islamic 
jurisprudence.”29 CPSA has also worked with Islamic centers to offer opportunities for 
Quranic memorization. Those who have memorized the Quran are known within Islam as 
huffaz, a special distinction that typically carries great respect within the religion. 
The Islamic environment at CPSA extends beyond the curriculum. All the women 
pictured on the school’s website wear the veil, from the female principal to the staff, 
faculty, and students. Students are separated by sex in physical education classes. The 
school realizes a focus on “inner personal development” through “the pursuit of 
understanding and implementation of the teachings of the Qur’an and the Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH).”30 The intended outcome of this development is “virtues such as 
respect for others, kindness, love, service, and sacrifice, so that [students] may become 
excellent Muslims and members of society.”31 When this personal development is 
combined with academic development, CPSA’s goal is “to foster an environment 
conducive to well-rounded individuals who will be well-equipped to succeed in the world 
around them as well as in the hereafter.”32 
There are, of course, numerous other Islamic schools and educational proposals 
that I could describe here. However, my review of Qaradawi’s proposal, Universal 
School, and CPSA should be enough to make my point that a range of educational 
                                                
29 Ibid. 
30 College Preparatory School of America, “Academics Overview,” accessed January 21, 2012, 
http://www.cpsaonline.com/academics. “PBUH” is an abbreviation of “Peace be upon him,” which is 
traditionally appended to references to Muhammad and other central Muslim figures as a sign of respect. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
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practices fall under the heading of Islamic education. This range is differentiated in part 
by how a particular school or proposal understands what it means to be a Muslim. 
Qaradawi wants students to embrace a particular interpretation of Islam that includes 
among its precepts the necessity to defend and expand the faith. Universal School and 
CPSA tend to avoid potentially divisive teachings of a particular understanding of Islam 
in favor of a more comprehensive approach that focuses especially on character. For 
Qaradawi, the entire educational program points toward producing devoted Muslims. For 
Universal School and CPSA, the aim is to provide a high-quality academic education 
within an Islamic environment that reinforces what they see as Muslim values. Universal 
School and CPSA do provide Islamic studies classes but the majority of the curricula 
offered by these schools are similar to what one might find at a secular school. 
These distinctions between kinds of Islamic education matter, for the purposes of 
this dissertation, because in Chapter 4 I will propose a modification of Harry Brighouse’s 
autonomy-facilitating education that could be acceptable to Islamic schools. However, as 
I will discuss, the traction that my proposal could gain in Islamic schools will depend on 
how particular schools understand the aims of Islamic education. As we will see, 
Qaradawi’s proposal is not conducive to the premises and aims of the kind of education 
for autonomy I will propose. However, more moderate Islamic schools, such as Universal 
School and CPSA, are more likely to be able to find my proposal to be acceptable.  




HARRY BRIGHOUSE’S AUTONOMY-FACILITATING EDUCATION 
In the previous chapter, I described three forms of Islamic education, one of 
which (Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s) can be classified as conservative and the other two of which 
(Universal School and the College Preparatory School of America) can be classified as 
moderate. In this chapter, I turn to the proposal for autonomy-facilitating education that 
Harry Brighouse develops in his book School Choice and Social Justice.1 Just as I am 
using Qaradawi, Universal School, and the College Preparatory School of American as 
representatives for Islamic education, I use Brighouse’s discussion as a representative for 
liberal education. I should emphasize again, as I did at the beginning of the chapter on 
Islamic education, that the goal of my dissertation is to use these descriptions of Islamic 
and liberal educational proposals in order to open up a discussion of ways that some 
Islamic schools can allow for a reasonable degree of individual autonomy. The goal of 
this chapter is to discuss both what autonomy is and one prominent proposal concerning 
the role that the development of autonomy should play in the schools of liberal 
democratic societies. 
This chapter has four sections. First, I offer a brief overview of the notion of 
personal autonomy through David Johnston’s discussion in his book The Idea of a 
Liberal Theory.2 Second, I describe how Harry Brighouse builds on this general 
                                                
1 Harry Brighouse, School Choice and Social Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
2 David Johnston, The Idea of a Liberal Theory: A Critique and Reconstruction (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1996). 
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understanding of personal autonomy in his own discussion of autonomy in School Choice 
and Social Justice. Third, I discuss Brighouse’s argument for the value of personal 
autonomy. Fourth, I describe how Brighouse proposes that the value of the facilitation of 
autonomy should shape the design of educational institutions: how he proposes that a 
theory of an autonomy-facilitating education might be put into practice. As we will see in 
the next chapter, Brighouse’s proposal as it is presents some difficulties for Islamic 
education, but there might be ways to modify his proposal so that Islamic schools would 
find it to be more acceptable. 
 
What Is Personal Autonomy? 
While the concept of autonomy has a complex history, I am interested here in 
describing how the variety of autonomy known as personal autonomy is generally 
understood in liberal thought, since this is the centerpiece of Brighouse’s proposal for 
autonomy-facilitating education.3 In his book The Idea of a Liberal Theory, David 
Johnston offers a succinct account of the meaning of personal autonomy, and I will draw 
from his discussion here. According to Johnston, personal autonomy “is achieved when a 
person autonomously chooses his own projects and values.”4 In other words, the 
individual who exhibits personal autonomy is one who not only has projects and values, 
but who also has actively chosen those projects and values. So a person who has been 
brainwashed into accepting his projects and values would not be personally autonomous, 
because he would not have chosen those projects and values for himself. 
                                                
3 For an excellent review of the development of the concept of autonomy in Western philosophy, see 
Jerome B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
4 Ibid., 75. 
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Johnston points out that advocates of personal autonomy do not usually mean that 
the autonomous individual chooses his projects and values entirely on her own: “As a 
matter of necessity, individuals base most of their values and ambitions on the values and 
ambitions that they see others adopt.”5 However, what advocates of personal autonomy 
do mean is that the individual is autonomous to the extent that he “subjects those values 
and projects to critical appraisal and fashions them into a relatively consistent and 
coherent whole.”6 The process of critical reflection is therefore a crucial condition for the 
choosing that is involved in attaining personal autonomy: one cannot be personally 
autonomous unless she has at some point reflected upon other ways of life than the one 
she is currently living. As a final point, I should note that individuals can be autonomous 
to varying degrees. For instance, a person might be autonomous in some aspects of his 
life, but not in others, depending on which aspects of his life he has subjected to critical 
reflection. 
 
Autonomy According to Brighouse 
I now focus on the way that Harry Brighouse understands personal autonomy, 
drawing from the general concept of personal autonomy described by Johnston. 
Brighouse is a contemporary political philosopher of education who is one of the leading 
proponents of autonomy as an important educational aim, most notably in his work 
School Choice and Social Justice. My discussion of Brighouse’s understanding of 
                                                
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
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autonomy will set up a discussion of the value that Brighouse places on autonomy, which 
leads him to argue in favor of the facilitation of autonomy as an aim of education. 
In School Choice and Social Justice, Brighouse discusses autonomy in the context 
of an argument in favor of school choice. He sees autonomy and, specifically, the child’s 
“interest in becoming an autonomous adult,” as one of the key factors that supports the 
provision of school choice in educational policy.7 Brighouse’s assertion that the child has 
an interest in becoming an autonomous adult is connected to the work of Joel Feinberg, 
who makes the argument that children have what he calls “the right to an open future.”8 
In other words, while the autonomy of children might necessarily be restricted because of 
their dependence on adults, they have an interest in one day becoming independent, or 
becoming autonomous. This interest must be protected, and instituting autonomy as an 
aim of education helps to do so. 
Brighouse also argues that “the principle that all children should have a real 
opportunity to become autonomous” should be “primarily relevant to the design of 
educational institutions.”9 Brighouse uses this point to make an argument for school 
choice, but here I want to examine why he believes that the development of autonomy is 
so important that it should be considered as a primary educational aim. Let us first 
understand exactly what Brighouse means by autonomy, since, as he recognizes, it is 
“used in many different ways by different theorists.”10 
                                                
7 Brighouse, School Choice and Social Justice, 65. 
8 See Joel Feinberg, “A Child’s Right to an Open Future,” in Freedom and Fulfillment: Philosophical 
Essays (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992). 
9 Brighouse, School Choice and Social Justice, 64. 
10 Ibid., 65. 
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Brighouse explains his idea of autonomy by describing “four familiar non-
autonomous processes.”11 By examining situations that he sees as clearly not 
autonomous, he hopes that we will better understand what autonomy is. First, he notes 
that a process is not autonomous if “coercive practices have illegitimately restricted the 
options available to the agent.”12 The point here is that, even if a person has a choice 
among a range of options in a particular situation, that person does not exercise autonomy 
through that choice if the options have been limited through coercion. Consider, for 
instance, a student who is told by his teacher that he can either pay the teacher fifty 
dollars or receive a failing grade on his assignment. The student has a choice here, but it 
cannot be considered an autonomous choice, because the teacher has illegitimately 
limited the student’s options. The mere fact of choice does not ensure autonomy; the way 
that the range of choices is constituted is also important. 
The second non-autonomous process Brighouse discusses occurs when “someone 
deliberately manipulates an agent by providing false information about the options 
available or costs and benefits attached to the options.”13 For example, suppose a school 
offers a student a choice between four courses without telling the student that one of the 
courses regularly receives complaints from students because of a neglectful teacher. In 
this situation, although the student has a choice and a range of options, the student is not 
exercising autonomy, since key information is being withheld from the student that 
would be likely to alter his decision. So far, then, we have seen that choice is important, a 
                                                
11 Ibid., 66. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
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range of options is important, and an accurate portrayal of those options is important, if 
autonomy is to be exercised. 
The third non-autonomous situation occurs when “people adapt their preferences 
or beliefs subconsciously to apparently unchangeable circumstances.”14 An example of 
this is a student who comes from a long line of farmers, and has come to believe that he, 
too, must become a farmer, regardless of what he might prefer to do, even though nobody 
in his family has told him that this is the case. This student is not autonomous, because 
his life has led him to believe (erroneously) that he must become a farmer — he has no 
choice in the matter. Thus, in addition to being able to make a choice over an accurately 
presented range of options, the autonomous person must also believe that he is the kind of 
person who can pursue multiple possibilities. This condition of autonomy does not relate 
so much to the range of options as it does to the background conditions of the person. 
Brighouse’s fourth non-autonomous process is one “whereby people consciously 
and deliberately accommodate their preferences to unjust background conditions.”15 We 
might think here of a student who has never attended a secondary school where college 
was presented as a real option for its graduates and he therefore decides to embrace the 
life of an unskilled laborer. This student makes a choice, but his choice is based on a 
limiting context (i.e., the subpar schools) over which he had no control. In addition to the 
background conditions of the person’s life, the background conditions of the person’s 
current situation must not be restrictive if autonomy is to be exercised. 
                                                
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., emphasis in original. 
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Based on Brighouse’s description of these four non-autonomous processes, what 
are the characteristics of an autonomous process? In summary, for a person to have the 
possibility of exercising autonomy, according to Brighouse, she must, first, have a range 
of options that, if it is restricted, is restricted only in legitimate ways. Second, she must 
have valid information about her available options and the costs and benefits associated 
with those options. Third, she must be able to determine whether or not she has altered 
her preferences or beliefs either subconsciously or consciously based on her past and 
present circumstances. Importantly, Brighouse notes that all people are subject to non-
autonomous processes — they are never wholly inescapable, and therefore a person will 
never be autonomous in every aspect of her life. However, Brighouse does believe that 
we can learn how “to avoid or overcome many instances of non-autonomy,” and that 
developing “the capacities involved in critical reflection” is how this can be done.16 In 
other words, Brighouse maintains that we will be better enable to live autonomously — 
we will be able to maximize autonomy in our lives — if we can bring critical reflection to 
bear on the way we live. 
Brighouse then raises a potential critique of his description of autonomy. He 
points out that “many of our commitments must be formed non-autonomously,” as they 
are formed in the background, “by internalizing impressions, by trusting the testimony of 
others, or by trusting our hunches.”17 Brighouse concedes that many commitments are 
indeed formed non-autonomously, as a result of our background conditions, but this does 
not mean that these commitments are beyond the reach of critical reflection and 
                                                
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 67. 
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autonomous processes. As Brighouse puts it, “Commitments generated by non-
autonomous processes become autonomous when the agent reflects upon them with an 
appropriate degree of critical attention.”18 So a process is autonomous either when it is 
produced autonomously or when it is reflected upon autonomously. This means that our 
lives are autonomous to the extent that we subject the processes that make up our lives to 
critical reflection, even if we choose to retain the aspects of our lives that were arrived at 
non-autonomously. Brighouse qualifies this point by noting that autonomy is really only 
concerned with matters of moral value. Things like “musical tastes” or “tastes in clothing 
and decor” — in other words, our preferences — are “morally trivial,” and do not 
influence the extent to which a person is autonomous.19 
To sum up, then, Brighouse understands autonomy to be a state that a person 
attains to the extent that his or her commitments (to be distinguished from preferences or 
tastes) have been subject to critical reflection in order to clear away the influences of 
coercion, misinformation, and mistaken beliefs that one’s circumstances are 
unchangeable. This is the notion that Brighouse has in mind when he says that enabling 
children to become autonomous adults is one of the key factors that should influence the 
development of educational institutions. 
 
Autonomy’s Value According to Brighouse 
Having explicated Brighouse’s understanding of autonomy, I now turn to his 
discussion of the value of autonomy. In order to argue that “the state [should] impose an 
                                                
18 Ibid. 
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autonomy-facilitating education on all children,” Brighouse obviously has to argue that 
autonomy, as he understands it, is of value — that it at least increases the possibility of 
living a good life.20 One way he can make this argument, he says, is to refer to the 
Socratic ideal that the unexamined life is not worth living.21 If this is the case, then in 
order for children’s adult lives to be worth living, they must learn how to examine those 
lives, and this means learning the skills involved in critical reflection in order that they 
might live autonomously. As he puts it, the argument goes like this: “Critical reflection 
on one’s own goals and values, on this view, is an essential part of living well. Since 
everyone should have an opportunity to live well, everyone should be taught to be 
autonomous.”22 Brighouse believes that this argument can be shown to fail. For instance, 
it would be odd to say that, between two people who have exactly the same values, the 
person who had come to those values autonomously had a life of worth, whereas the life 
of the person who had absorbed those values non-autonomously was worthless. “It may 
be plausible,” Brighouse writes, “to say that autonomy adds worth to a life lived 
according to good values, but quite implausible to say that it is a precondition of that life 
having worth.”23 This means that autonomy can contribute to making a life better — the 
autonomous life is better than the non-autonomous life — but one’s life can have value 
(i.e., it is possible to live a good life) without it. 




23 Ibid., 68. 
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After dismissing the Socratic argument, Brighouse turns to Amy Gutmann’s 
argument for educating for autonomy.24 According to Brighouse, her argument is rooted 
in the view that “the state has an interest in teaching children how to be good democratic 
citizens,” and this, she believes, means that the state “has to expose them to a range of 
political views, and to equip them with the skills needed to reflect on them rationally.”25 
It would be difficult, however, to teach autonomy just in regard to political commitments, 
as Gutmann’s brand of democratic education requires, so democratic education leads to 
teaching autonomy in such a way that it can be applied across one’s life. Brighouse finds 
fault with Gutmann’s argument, though, because it “deploys a conception of justice that 
places too much weight on the value of democratic participation.”26 Gutmann believes 
that democratic participation is a political duty (this is why the state can require that its 
citizens adopt the skills necessary to engage in it), but Brighouse think that this view goes 
too far — justice does not require democratic participation — and thus prevents her 
argument for teaching autonomy (as a key component of democratic education) from 
having wide appeal. 
So Brighouse rejects the arguments that the state should provide an autonomy-
facilitating education because autonomy is intrinsically valuable or because autonomy is 
instrumentally valuable for providing civic education in a democracy. His own argument 
for teaching autonomy, the one he believes to be the strongest, is “instrumental,” but in a 
different way than Gutmann’s. Brighouse’s argument is that autonomy should be 
                                                
24 Gutmann makes this argument most notably in Democratic Education, rev. ed. (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1999). 
25 Brighouse, School Choice and Social Justice, 68. 
26 Ibid. 
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facilitated in education because people can use it as an instrument to make their lives 
better, and justice requires that the state attempt to enable its members to lead good lives, 
whether or not autonomy is intrinsically or politically (or democratically) valuable.27 In 
other words, the foundation of Brighouse’s instrumental argument is that autonomy is an 
instrument for justice, which “requires that each individual have significant opportunities 
to live a life which is good for them.”28 A state aiming to be just would therefore want to 
provide its members with such opportunities to the best of its ability.29 
Brighouse’s next point is that, for a person to have a significant opportunity to 
live a life that is good for her, she must have “some sense of what constitutes living 
well.”30 Therefore, the state wanting to provide its members with opportunities to live 
well must provide each of those members with some sense of what it would mean for him 
or her to live well. This view does allow for multiple conceptions of a well-lived life: the 
value of autonomy is that it allows an individual to determine what living well means for 
him, though this might differ from another individual’s determination of what living well 
means for her. 
Next, Brighouse claims that “the basic methods of rational evaluation are reliable 
aids to uncovering how to live well.”31 These methods are “especially important,” says 
Brighouse, in the contemporary world, where we might become “easily lost in the moral 
                                                
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., 68–69. 
29 Note that providing the opportunity to live a good life is different than actually providing that good life 
itself. In other words, as long as a person has the opportunity to live a good life for him, the state has met 
its obligation under justice, even if that person fails to capitalize on that opportunity. 
30 Brighouse, School Choice and Social Justice, 69. 
31 Ibid. 
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and economic complexity of modernity” without them.32 Brighouse recognizes that this 
modern complexity does not demand that people adopt the methods of rational evaluation 
in order to live well — some people might stumble upon (or be led to) a well-lived life 
without subjecting their commitments to rational evaluation at all. However, Brighouse 
argues that “children will be better able to live well if they are able rationally to compare 
different ways of life.”33 In other words, children might be able to live well without 
autonomy, but they will have a better chance of living well if they are autonomous. 
Brighouse then expands upon what he means by “living well,” which is crucial for 
our purposes, because here we get a sense of the notion of the good life that supports (and 
is tied up with) autonomy, which contrasts with the view that Yusuf al-Qaradawi 
advances. For Brighouse, there are two components to living well: “the way of life must 
be good; and the person living it must endorse it ‘from the inside.’”34 In order for a life to 
be lived well, then, the content of the life must be deemed good in some objective sense, 
and the person living that good life must identify with it.35 Brighouse would not say that 
the excellent murderer was living his life well, even if the murderer identified wholly 
with his life of crime, because murder is (we would generally agree) not good. 
Additionally, Brighouse would not say that the perfect saint was living her life well, even 
if everyone agreed that her life was filled with good things, if she did not identify with 
her life — if she really preferred to be a murderer rather than a saint, for instance. 
                                                
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., emphasis added. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Brighouse does not discuss how exactly to determine whether a form of life is good, which is something 
that would have to be fleshed out in order to implement his notion of autonomy in educational institutions. 
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Autonomy and the rational deliberation it involves enable a person to live well, 
according to Brighouse, because it facilitates these two components of a good life. In 
other words, autonomy allows us to consider whether a particular form of life is good in 
itself, and it allows us to consider a variety of forms of the good life in order to find one 
with which we identify. Again, this is why Brighouse calls his argument an instrumental 
one: the state should provide autonomy-facilitating education because it has the practical 
consequence of improving people’s chances of living well, and enabling people to pursue 
opportunities to live well is a crucial element of a just society; so the state that aims for 
justice has an interest in facilitating the development of autonomy in its members, 
including its children. But does it demand that a liberal democratic state do so through its 
schools? Brighouse says that this question can be answered by examining “the character 
of [a society’s] non-educational institutions and facts about developmental 
psychology.”36 
The character of a society’s non-educational institutions matter because it is 
possible that a society will provide autonomy facilitation in some other way, outside of 
its schools. Perhaps autonomy is simply unavoidable in a certain society — perhaps it is 
just the way that things are done. In the Europe of the Middle Ages, “everyone” was 
Christian. Perhaps, in some society, there is an institution that ensures that “everyone” is 
autonomous. However, Brighouse believes “this is false in most liberal democracies” 
because no such institution exists.37 
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As for developmental psychology, Brighouse’s assumption is that “to hold one’s 
moral commitments autonomously requires the use of skills and knowledge which, for 
most people, must be explicitly taught.”38 The point is that there would be no need for the 
state to facilitate autonomy in its schools if everyone learned the skills involved in 
rational deliberation as part of normal human development. Assuming, though, that (1) a 
society aiming for justice does not have a non-educational institution that facilitates 
autonomy and (2) people do not normally become autonomous without being taught the 
skills needed to do so, then the just society must provide an autonomy-facilitating 
education for its children in its schools. 
Brighouse notes that he is using an “abstract” conception of autonomy because it 
rests on the notion of rational reflection, which is itself abstract.39 It does not “suffice to 
weigh different alternatives of how to live,” meaning that a simple reference to rational 
reflection does not fully tell us how the weighing of alternatives should take place, but 
“no other known device is so reliable in this area of human understanding.”40 Rational 
reflection leading toward autonomy is, in essence, the best tool we have for determining 
how we should live our lives, even if it is a somewhat abstract ideal. 
Recall that Brighouse’s argument “starts with the obligation which adults have 
towards prospective adults, to provide them with certain kinds of opportunity to live 
well.”41 This obligation is present because of “the fundamental interest each person has in 
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living well.”42 Once this obligation is established, then autonomy-facilitating education 
can be invoked as the best instrument for ensuring that the liberal democratic state is able 
to fulfill this obligation. So autonomy has value to the extent that it fulfills this 
obligation; and the basis of this obligation is justice. It is justice that obligates the state to 
provide its members with the opportunity to live well, and it is this obligation that 
requires an autonomy-facilitating education. So autonomy is valuable because of its 
connection to justice. 
He raises one objection to this claim, however, via Francis Schrag’s argument that 
autonomy-facilitating education is not required, since it is possible to live a good life 
non-autonomously.43 Schrag offers as an example a woman who converted to Orthodox 
Judaism as an adult and is able to articulate why this life is well lived. Although she 
chose to live this life autonomously, Brighouse notes that “it would be implausible to 
think that the goodness of her way of life depends on its being chosen autonomously.”44 
With Schrag, Brighouse agrees that this case shows that a “way of life can be lived well 
even when it is not chosen autonomously.”45 If this is indeed the case — if Schrag is right 
— then it would seem that, in Brighouse’s words, “we do not need to teach children the 
skills needed to make comparative evaluations between their parents’ and other ways of 
life in order to give them a real opportunity to live well.”46 
                                                
42 Ibid. 
43 See Francis Schrag, “Diversity, Schooling, and the Liberal State,” Studies in Philosophy and Education 
17, no. 1 (1998). 
44 Brighouse, School Choice and Social Justice, 72. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 72–3. 
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While conceding Schrag’s point that a life that is not chosen autonomously can in 
fact be a well-lived life, Brighouse does not think it therefore follows that we do not need 
to provide children with an autonomy-facilitating education. This is because, in a 
situation of pluralism, there is a “recognition that people have different personalities, 
characters, or internal constitutions, that suit them differently well to different ways of 
life; and these differences do not correlate perfectly with the demands of their parents’ or 
their communities’ religious commitments.”47 The point Brighouse is making here is that, 
while it is possible that a child will live a good life by accepting (for example) the 
religious commitments of their parents or communities, not all children will be able to 
live a good life in this way, because some children will be constituted in such a way that 
they will not be able to live well by accepting their parents’ or communities’ 
commitments. (And recall that Schrag’s example involves an adult.) Brighouse offers as 
an example a homosexual person, who would likely not be able to live well by accepting 
his parents’ commitments if those commitments included a religious position that viewed 
homosexuality as a sin. In summary, “if what we might call constitution pluralism [i.e., 
the recognition that people have different internal constitutions] is true, and religious 
parents are permitted to exempt their children from autonomy-facilitation, then some 
children will have few or no opportunities for living well.”48 This, Brighouse says, is 
unjust. 
Brighouse then raises another objection to his argument: most individuals will 
have a chance to exit the web of commitments held by their parents and communities at 
                                                
47 Ibid., 73. 
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some point.49 However, even if this is the case, these individuals still suffer from injustice 
because they will not have received preparation for functioning autonomously outside of 
those commitments. Even if they can leave a web of commitments, they will not know 
how to function autonomously outside of that web, which means that exiting really is not 
an option at all. “Justice, it appears, requires that they be educationally prepared for 
mainstream society: since they cannot be identified before the fact, this suggests that 
justice requires that all children receive some sort of autonomy-facilitating education.”50 
 
The Curricular Implications of Brighouse’s Autonomy-Facilitating Education 
Having made a case that justice requires that the state provide children with an 
autonomy-facilitating education because it has the instrumental effect of enhancing 
students’ opportunities to live well, Brighouse then draws out the implications of this 
argument for the school curriculum. He mentions four. First, children would learn “the 
traditional academic content-based curriculum,” because 
an autonomous life cannot be led without the information about the world 
in which it is led, and the critical thinking skills involved in autonomy can neither 
be developed nor exercised without the ease of access to a considerable amount of 
information which is provided only by having learned and internalized it.51 
                                                
49 Susan Moller Okin discusses the issue of exit rights, which we will return to in the next chapter, in 
“‘Mistresses of Their Own Destiny’: Group Rights, Gender, and Realistic Rights of Exit,” in Citizenship 
and Education in Liberal-Democratic Societies, eds. Kevin McDonough and Walter Feinberg (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2003). 
50 Brighouse, School Choice and Social Justice, 74. 
51 Ibid. 
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Brighouse’s point here is just that a focus on the facilitation of autonomy would 
not negate the need for the traditional content-based curriculum.  
Second, children would learn “how to identify various sorts of fallacious 
arguments, and how to distinguish among them, as well as between them and non-
fallacious arguments.”52 These skills would be needed for individuals to be able to 
evaluate arguments for and against particular ways of living. 
Third, children would learn “about a range of religious, non-religious, and anti-
religious ethical views in some detail; about the kinds of reasoning deployed within those 
views; and the attitudes of proponents toward non-believers, heretics, and the secular 
world.”53 This curricular component is necessary because these views constitute the range 
of options from which students would determine how they could live well. 
Fourth, children would learn 
about the diverse ways, including non-reason-based ways, in which secular and 
religious thinkers have dealt with moral conflict and religious disagreements, and 
with tensions in their own views; and how individuals have described, and to the 
extent possible how they have experienced, conversion experiences, losses of 
faith, and reasoned abandonment of ethical positions.54 
This would help students to deal with moral conflicts that arise in their lives, and 
it would also help them to understand how one’s conception of what it means to live well 
can change over the course of one’s life. Brighouse emphasizes the presentation of 
alternative ethical viewpoints, since autonomy requires the availability of a range of 
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options for reflection; but he also notes that the way in which these views are presented is 
crucial, so that the presentation “reflects the reality of the lives lived according to these 
commitments.”55 This could be best achieved, according to Brighouse, “by allowing 
proponents of views to address children in the controlled environment of the 
classroom.”56 Brighouse finds support for this position in John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, 
where Mill argues that a person “must be able to hear [arguments] from persons who 
actually believe them” in order “to do justice to the arguments.”57 
Thus far, we have discussed Brighouse’s instrumental argument for autonomy-
facilitating education and the curricular changes that he believes would be required if his 
argument holds. In order to understand why Brighouse argues for an autonomy-
facilitating education, as opposed to an autonomy-promoting education, we should 
examine how he contrasts his view with autonomy-promoting education of the type 
endorsed by Amy Gutmann.58 
The key difference between Gutmann’s autonomy-promoting education and his 
own autonomy-facilitating education, according to Brighouse, is that Gutmann actively 
promotes autonomy as a value of the good democratic citizen, while Brighouse simply 
wants autonomy to be an option available to citizens, leaving the choice of whether or not 
to exercise it up to them. As he puts it, autonomy-facilitating education “aims to enable 
                                                
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (New York: Norton, 1975), 36, quoted in Brighouse, School Choice and 
Social Justice, 75. 
58 Specifically, Brighouse references Amy Gutmann’s Democratic Education and her “Civic Education and 
Social Diversity,” Ethics 105 (1995). 
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them to live autonomously should they wish to.”59 It is true that Brighouse argues in 
favor of facilitating autonomy in education because he does claim that “the skills needed 
rationally to reflect on alternative choices about how to live is a crucial component of 
providing them with substantive freedom and real opportunities” and that “people’s lives 
go better when they deploy the skills associated with autonomy,” but he does not think 
that this instrumental argument supports the actual promotion of autonomy in a state 
system of education. Such a system should enable autonomy, according to Brighouse’s 
argument, but the argument does not obligate the state to ensure that people actually 
exercise this capability in their lives. However, the arguments for autonomy-promoting 
education, such as Gutmann’s, do obligate the state to ensure that people actually 
exercise autonomy, both because democratic citizenship requires it and because the 
autonomous life is seen as intrinsically better than the non-autonomous life. In other 
words, in essence, Gutmann argues that autonomy is a necessary value in a democratic 
society, and a democratic education that prepares citizens to participate in such a society 
must promote autonomy — education is undemocratic if it does not. Brighouse says that 
he is open to the possibility that education should actively promote autonomy, but his 
instrumental argument only goes so far as to support the facilitation of autonomy, since 
the goal of living a good life can be achieved without it. 
 
Final Words 
Brighouse’s central argument that the education provided by a liberal state should 
facilitate the development of autonomy is, as he puts it, an instrumental one. This 
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instrumental argument rests on the assertion that people will, all things being equal, have 
better lives if they exercise autonomy, and that justice obligates the state to enable people 
to lead good lives to the extent that it is possible. My aim in raising Brighouse’s 
argument is to offer a template for an autonomy-facilitating education that we can start 
from when considering how Islamic schools might facilitate a reasonable degree of 
individual autonomy. For Brighouse, the instrumental effect of an education that 
facilitates autonomy is that it can actually make people’s lives better by enabling them to 
exercise autonomy. Brighouse does believe that people can have good lives without the 
exercise of autonomy, but since we cannot predict who these people will be, everyone 
should be able to exercise autonomy in the (likely, thinks Brighouse) chance that they 
will have better lives if they exercise this capability. 
In the next chapter, I will use my descriptions of Islamic education from the 
previous chapter, combined with my description of Brighouse’s autonomy-facilitating 
education here, in order to draw out the tensions between liberalism and Islam with 
regard to the role of the development of autonomy in education. After demonstrating that 
the key point of tension is the inclusion of critical reflection across a range of options in 
Brighouse’s proposal, I will suggest a modification to this proposal that leads to an 
educational curriculum – Worldview Education – that might satisfy Brighouse’s desire to 
facilitate autonomy while also satisfying the concern of Islamic educators not to 
undermine the integrity of their faith. We will see that Qaradawi’s educational proposal is 
likely to leave little room for my proposal to achieve its aims, but that more moderate 
Islamic schools such as Universal School and the College Preparatory School of 
America, would be more likely to find the Worldview Education acceptable. In the final 
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chapter of the dissertation, I will build on my sketch of Worldview Education in order to 
offer more detail about what such a curriculum could look like in Islamic schools.  




THE POSSIBILITY OF AN AUTONOMY-FACILITATING ISLAMIC EDUCATION 
A primary aim of education, as a rule, is to enable people to live better lives. It 
would make little sense to educate for something that the educator did not believe would 
do the educated some good.1 In liberal thought, autonomy is usually understood to be a 
central component of a good life, on the grounds that being able to determine the course 
of one’s own life is better than having one’s way of life decided upon by others.2 
Therefore, the development of autonomy is usually understood to be a central aim of 
liberal education. I have presented an example of this kind of view through the work of 
Harry Brighouse in School Choice and Social Justice, where he argues in favor of an 
autonomy-facilitating education on the grounds that it will help children to be better able 
to live well. As I discussed in the previous chapter, Brighouse contrasts his view with the 
autonomy-promoting education favored by Amy Gutmann (among others).3 An 
autonomy-promoting education actually teaches students that they should exercise 
autonomy, while an autonomy-facilitating education only aims to give students the 
capacity to exercise autonomy. One of Brighouse’s complaints against an education that 
promotes autonomy is that it in fact undermines autonomy by directing students to 
                                                
1 See Richard S. Peters, “What Is an Educational Process?” in The Concept of Education, ed. Richard S. 
Peters (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967). 
2 As I discussed in the previous chapter, David Johnston offers an overview of this aspect of liberal theory 
in The Idea of a Liberal Theory: A Critique and Reconstruction (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1996). A more detailed discussion of the origins and development of the concept of autonomy can be 
found in Jerome B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
3 Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education, rev. ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
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become autonomous — “I order you to be autonomous.”4 In other words, an autonomy-
promoting education does not allow students to make an autonomous decision about 
whether or not to exercise autonomy. Brighouse also believes that an autonomy-
promoting education could have the effect of forcing students away from their parents’ 
ways of life, which goes against an element of parenting that makes it so meaningful for 
many individuals.5 Brighouse maintains that his autonomy-facilitating education avoids 
these problems by giving students the capacity to become autonomous, while leaving the 
initial choices of whether or not to encourage autonomy up to the parents and whether or 
not to exercise autonomy up to the students. For instance, Amish parents would not be 
directly undermined in their attempts to guide their children into an Amish way of life. At 
the same time, their children would not be forced to maintain this way of life, since they 
would have the capacity to exercise their autonomy and break away, if they opted to do 
so. An autonomy-facilitating education would not encourage the children to break away, 
though it would enable them to do so. 
However, Brighouse’s proposal for an autonomy-facilitating education poses a 
potential problem for models of Islamic education, such as those I described in Chapter 2. 
In Islam, submission to the will of God is usually understood to be a central component 
of a good life. Therefore, submission is usually understood to be a central aim of Islamic 
education. This view can take different forms, based on one's understanding of Islam, as I 
have shown in the course of my discussion of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Universal School, and 
the College Preparatory School of America (CPSA). The distinction between autonomy 
                                                
4 Walter Feinberg suggested this phrasing via email in a comment on an earlier draft of this dissertation 
(November 20, 2011). 
5 See Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, “Parents’ Rights and the Value of the Family,” Ethics 117 (2006). 
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and submission to the will of God as sources of the good life represents perhaps the 
central tension between liberal and Islamic worldviews. Liberalism, through autonomy, 
calls for individuals to look within themselves for sources of the good life, whereas 
Islam, through submission, calls for individuals to find such sources through 
understandings of Islamic tradition based primarily, though not exclusively, on the Qur'an 
and the Sunna. In this chapter, I explore the issues that this contradiction raises with 
regard to the question of how Islamic schools can provide an education that facilitates 
autonomy while not undermining religious belief. The central question of the chapter, 
therefore, is whether it is possible to modify Brighouse’s proposal for an autonomy-
facilitating education for use in Islamic schools in such a way that both Brighouse and at 
least some Islamic schools would find it acceptable. 
When we discuss the aims of education in a liberal pluralist society, we must 
recognize that this discussion has to apply to people who disagree on the components of a 
good life, and thus disagree on what education should do in order to enable individuals to 
live well. We must also recognize that there are at least three actors who have an interest 
in how the aims of education are determined: the state, parents, and children. These 
actors are internally diverse. The liberal state has no official position on what constitutes 
the good life, though it presumably wants its members to live well. Parents are likely to 
have a position on this issue, and they are also likely to want their children to think 
likewise. Children are unlikely to have a perspective on what it means to lead a good life 
until they learn it from others. 
From the perspective of many adult Muslims, the path to the good life is known: it 
is the straight path of Islam. As we have seen from our examples of Islamic educational 
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thought and practice, Muslims might disagree on exactly what this path entails, but 
certain features, encapsulated by Islam’s Pillars and Articles of Faith, are generally held 
in common. Muslim parents will want their children to follow this path, and they will 
want their children’s education to guide them into, and along, this path. Brighouse’s 
autonomy-facilitating education could be problematic for these parents, because it might 
lead their children away from the straight path by forcing them to engage in critical 
reflection across a variety of worldviews, including their own. 
Of course, those who do not believe that the straight path of Islam constitutes the 
good life might find these parents’ viewpoint just as problematic as those parents find the 
facilitation of autonomy. Broadly, there are two kinds of objections here: One view is that 
these parents are preventing their children from playing a role in determining their own 
ways of life. Those advocating the facilitation of autonomy would hold this view. 
Another view is that these parents are guiding their children down a road that does not in 
fact lead to a good life. Those advocating submission to other authorities, such as some 
other religious believers, would hold this view. Either way, the children are being misled. 
This dilemma focuses on what it means to enable a child to live well. Another 
dilemma focuses on what it means for parents to live well. A component of a good life 
for many, if not all, parents is that their children adopt a view of the good life that aligns 
with their own. Parents who believe that a good life must be determined autonomously 
will want their children to believe likewise, just as parents who believe that the good life 
is achieved through submission will want their children to believe this as well. 
If we want to promote living well in general, we have to take the situations of 
both parents and children into account. Promoting a good life for parents leads us to 
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allow parents to determine how their children are educated with regard to the good life. 
However, promoting a good life for children leads us to determine how children are 
educated with regard to the good life based on the view of a good life that we happen to 
hold, which may or may not coincide with the views of parents. 
For a concrete example of how this tension can affect children, imagine a gay 
student – or even a student who might one day recognize that he is gay – in a particular 
Islamic school that teaches that homosexuality is against the will of God. If this student is 
taught that Islam offers the only path to a good life, then he is caught between, on the one 
hand, living a way of life that is true to himself but that will, if what he has been taught is 
true, lead to damnation and, on the other hand, living a way of life that is supposed to 
lead to salvation but comes with self-denial and, very likely, self-hatred. Or imagine a 
high-achieving female student – or even a female student who demonstrates the potential 
to excel in her studies – who attends a particular Islamic school that teaches that the 
proper place of women is as caretakers of the home; women’s ambitions are to be limited 
solely to the domestic sphere. This student is caught in a similar dilemma to the gay 
student: she can realize who she is and violate her faith or she can lead a putatively good 
Islamic life full of thwarted ambitions. Situations such as these highlight the pressing 
problem that is raised by considerations of how we formulate the aims of education with 
regard to the good life. An autonomy-facilitating education would undoubtedly allow 
these children to lead better lives, but from some Islamic points of view, these improved 
worldly lives would hardly be worth the damnation that is sure to come – any life ending 
in damnation cannot ultimately be a good life. 
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A possible compromise is to educate children in such a way that their 
development of autonomy is facilitated, along the lines suggested by Brighouse, but 
within an Islamic environment, such as that provided by Universal School and the CPSA, 
that includes such elements as dress codes, prayers, halal food, and a special focus on 
Islamic history and thought. In this way, both autonomy and Islam would be facilitated. 
Children would learn what it means to be a good Muslim, but they would also acquire the 
capability to critique various views of the good life and choose among them for 
themselves. But there is a problem here: Brighouse’s autonomy-facilitating education 
requires critical engagement with a variety of worldviews, including one's own. This kind 
of engagement is exactly the thing that some Muslim parents would want to avoid 
because, for them, one’s worldview is not an open question that should be subjected to 
critical engagement. 
The problem for some Muslims with Brighouse’s proposal for an autonomy-
facilitating education is that it tends to have an equalizing effect on worldviews: many of 
the views will be presented as valid options. A sort of marketplace of worldviews is 
presented to students. Students browse the available selections, reflect on the 
possibilities, and then make their choices based on their preferences. This approach to 
worldviews only makes sense, however, if one accepts that the individual's preference 
should play a central role in determining the overall shape of one’s life. Admittedly, in an 
autonomy-facilitating education, the preference is meant to be a reasoned preference: it 
should involve more reflection than, say, choosing a meal. Further, Brighouse recognizes 
that one’s community will necessarily shape one’s choices: no one is completely 
autonomous, beyond the reach of all external influence. But one’s way of life should still 
  73 
ultimately come down to the individual's free choice. What "feels" right to the individual 
is going to matter. 
But a great number of people believe that individual preference is irrelevant when 
it comes to fundamental aspects of a good life. If one believes that there is a God who 
says that the good life requires certain beliefs and practices, and a commitment to 
preserving the integrity of a particular community, then how can individuals really 
question this? In this context, individual preference could be an obstacle to a good life, 
not part of the path. While it is true that some individuals might choose to accept 
submission as a result of an autonomy-facilitating education, it is just as true that some 
individuals will not. Within strains of Islam, as within strains of Christianity, there is the 
view that people are weak; they are easily tempted away from the straight path — this 
point comes up repeatedly in Islamic thought6 — we do not want to encourage this 
tendency through children's education! 
What we are dealing with here is a stark contrast between the liberal and Islamic 
worldviews with regard to what it means to live well. (And I should note that this does 
not just apply to Islam — it applies to any worldview that accepts a notion of the good 
life rooted in submission to an infallible authority.) In the liberal worldview, a way of life 
that is not at least partly the result of autonomous processes would be suspect: a good life 
must necessarily involve a way of life that is the result of critical reflection across a range 
of options. In the Islamic worldview, whatever the differences in interpretation between 
sects and legal schools, a path to a good life that is not based in some way on the Qur'an 
                                                
6 See, for instance, Qur’an 12:53: “I do not pretend to be blameless, for man’s very soul incites him to evil 
unless my Lord shows mercy: He is most forgiving, most merciful.” This translation is from Muhammad 
A.S. Abdel Haleem, trans., The Qur’an (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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and the Sunna would be suspect: the good life must necessarily involve submission to 
God's path. The good life is either the result of autonomous processes or it is threatened 
by these processes. 
Is the contrast really this stark? For some, it certainly is. Advocates of autonomy-
promoting education, such as Gutmann, are unlikely to accept any education that does not 
explicitly promote autonomy. Some Muslims would be unlikely to accept any education 
that does not adhere uncritically to the Qur'an and the Sunna. But there are other views 
within these traditions that do not see this contrast so dichotomously. For instance, 
Brighouse is willing to accept that autonomy is not necessary for a good life; this is part 
of why he argues for the facilitation of autonomy rather than its outright promotion. 
Autonomy might make it more likely that a given child will live well; but one can live 
well without it. And there are Muslims who accept interpretations of Islam that allow for 
other paths to a good life.7 There are also Muslims who might accept a role for autonomy 
in Islam, whether or not they view Islam as the only path to the good life: what good is 
submission if it is not freely given?8 
Imagine a child about to enter formal schooling in kindergarten. She is 5 years 
old. How can we best enable her to live well through her schooling? We might try to 
answer this question abstractly, in regard to a generic "child" who "we" want to live well. 
But this would only work if there was a universally agreed upon notion of the good life. 
Since there is not, the answer to the question is going to depend on who is in charge of 
the child's education. If the child's parents were followers of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, they 
                                                
7 See Mohammad Hassan Khalil, Islam and the Fate of Others: The Salvation Question (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012). 
8 See Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari’a 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008). 
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might believe that they were enabling her to live well by sending her to a school using 
Qaradawi's educational proposal. If the child's parents were recent Muslim immigrants to 
Bridgeview, Illinois, or Lombard, Illinois, they might believe that they were enabling her 
to live well by sending her to Universal School or the CPSA, respectively. If the child's 
parents endorsed Brighouse's work in School Choice and Social Justice, they might 
enable her to live well by sending her to a school that facilitated autonomy according to 
Brighouse’s proposal. Who gets to decide for any given child? 
A quick answer is that a child's parents or guardians get to decide how she is 
educated. But this assumes that the child does not have educational interests of her own. 
Joel Feinberg has discussed the right of a child to an "open future," which essentially says 
that children have the right not to be locked into the way of life of their parents.9 This 
kind of argument can be countered by the position that parents should have the right to 
determine how their children are educated, since this is a key element of a good life for 
many parents.10 In addition, it is unclear who should have the right to direct a child's 
educational path, if not the parents. Is this something we would want to hand over 
entirely to the state? To a particular community?11 All of these actors have an interest in 
how children are educated, but the difficulty arises when we try to balance these interests 
against one another, especially in situations where the interests conflict. For instance, the 
autonomy promoters might argue that, because we do not know in advance how any 
given child is going to turn out, we should not push him or her into a particular view of 
                                                
9 Joel Feinberg, “The Child’s Right to an Open Future” in Freedom and Fulfillment: Philosophical Essays 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992). 
10 Brighouse and Swift, “Parents’ Rights and the Value of the Family.” 
11 This is Plato’s proposal in the Republic, where children would be taken from their parents by the state in 
order to be educated on the basis of how they could best fit society’s needs. 
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what the good life entails. But those advocating submission would respond that, yes, we 
do not know how any given child is going to turn out in advance, but this really does not 
matter, because submission is a central component of the good life for everyone, whether 
they realize it or not. Once again, we are back to fundamentally different worldviews. 
The dilemma is especially salient when we consider children, because they are 
vulnerable. Also, they do not come into the world with a view of the good life. They have 
not embraced liberalism, Islam, or any other worldview. What they are taught about 
living well becomes particularly important, because they will not yet hold their own 
views on this matter. Importantly, though, children will not learn about the good life just 
at school. Their parents or guardians will clearly have a significant influence on how they 
come to think of a good human life. In addition, children’s conceptions of the good life 
are likely to be shaped by their peers and the media they consume. Of course, this could 
mean that there is all the more reason to facilitate autonomy in schools, since there is no 
guarantee that children will become autonomous at home, and since children need some 
way to sift through the variety of influences they will encounter in society. But an 
autonomy-facilitating education could undo much of what parents teach their children 
about a good life, and therefore much of what makes being a parent a key component of 
living well for many people. Perhaps it should be the child's decision: the child should 
decide what kind of schooling they experience. But, first, it is unclear that children are in 
the position to make this sort of decision, especially when they are younger; and, second, 
this view is itself the result of a belief in the importance of autonomy for the good life. If 
children are making these decisions, then autonomy has already won. 
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And yet, as the earlier scenarios about the gay and high-achieving students 
emphasize, children’s interests should play some role in determining how we teach about 
the good life, even if those children are not in the position to protect their interests 
themselves. Brighouse’s autonomy-facilitating education is designed to do just this, but 
as I have discussed, it poses potential difficulties for religious schools in that it presents 
one’s way of life as a matter of individual choice. The question is thus whether it is 
possible to “tweak” Brighouse’s proposal in such a way as to have it play a role in 
religious education – specifically, Islamic education. In what remains of this chapter, I 
will develop a proposal for a compromise between the autonomy facilitators and the 
submission promoters and then discuss whether it could work in forms of Islamic 
education such as the ones I described in Chapter 2. The proposal will not be acceptable 
to those who advocate an autonomy-promoting education or those who do not want their 
children even to be exposed to other worldviews, but I do think it would appeal to the 
vast majority of individuals, who dwell somewhere in the middle. 
In short, I propose a curriculum that can facilitate both autonomy and submission 
in Islamic schools, as long as those schools provided for critical thinking in other parts of 
the curriculum. My curriculum would not push a child toward either autonomy or 
submission — it would not promote either. Rather, it would show a child how people 
have approached the question of the good life in a wide variety of ways, both religious 
and secular. The form of education I propose would appeal to the autonomy facilitators, 
since it would indeed facilitate autonomy, as long as critical thinking was learned 
elsewhere in the curriculum; but I think it would also appeal to many Muslims, in that it 
could take place within an Islamic environment without explicitly undermining the faith.  
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Shelley Burtt advances a proposal with similar intent.12 She focuses on 
“comprehensive educations,” which has the goal of “fitting the child with the worldview, 
personal commitments, and moral understandings that his parents and the faith 
community that he inhabits believe to be necessary to live a good life.”13 Most forms of 
Islamic education fit this description. She notes that this is typically contrasted — as I 
have done — with the liberal educational goal of autonomy, which she defines broadly as 
thinking and knowing for ourselves. Her central argument is that “the achievement of 
autonomy correctly understood is not threatened by the major sorts of religious and 
cultural education on offer today.”14 This does not mean, she writes, that all 
comprehensive educations will make their students autonomous; but it does mean that 
comprehensive educations and educations for autonomy are not mutually exclusive. I 
have emphasized the phrase “correctly understood” because her argument hinges on an 
atypical understanding of what is required to make someone an autonomous individual. 
Focusing on the definition of autonomy as “to think and know for oneself,” Burtt 
proposes that “we place independent thought and action rather than free choice at the 
center of our understanding of autonomy.”15 On this view, an individual would be 
considered autonomous not on the basis of whether or not her way of life was the result 
of critical engagement leading to selection from among a range of options, but on the 
                                                
12 Shelley Burtt, “Comprehensive Educations and the Liberal Understanding of Autonomy” in Citizenship 
and Education in Liberal-Democratic Societies: Teaching for Cosmopolitan Values and Collective 
Identities, eds. Kevin McDonough and Walter Feinberg (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
13 Ibid., 179. 
14 Ibid., 180, emphasis mine. 
15 Ibid., 184. 
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basis of whether or not the individual could act or think independently. This is a more 
minimalist view of autonomy when compared to that endorsed by Brighouse. 
Burtt does acknowledge that forms of comprehensive education involving, for 
instance, “an unquestioning obedience to the dictates of a religious leader” would not 
allow for autonomy, on her view.16 But her point is that there are forms of comprehensive 
education that do not encourage such orthodoxy.17 She argues that a comprehensive 
education can provide for autonomy by educating for three things: “moral courage…, 
familiarity with the idea of ‘character pluralism,’ and a belief that good lives must feel 
right ‘from the inside.’”18 By moral courage, she means “the ability to resist pressures to 
conform, to act on one’s understanding of the good in the face of familial and peer 
disapproval.”19 “Character pluralism” is the view “that individuals come with different 
needs, characters, gifts, and abilities,” which “implies that the good life for one person 
may not be a rewarding life for another.”20 The belief that good lives must feel right 
“from the inside” “encourages the individual to insist that the fundamental principles to 
which he conforms be experienced as right for him, the sort of person he is and has, 
through his experience, circumstances, and education, come to be.”21 Burtt argues that 
these three components are enough to facilitate autonomy and are part of most forms of 
comprehensive education. The primary aspect of other forms of autonomy-facilitating 
                                                
16 Ibid., 185. 
17 Another way to put this is that forms of comprehensive education that involved indoctrination would not 
allow for autonomy. I will raise the issue of indoctrination again in reference to Qaradawi’s proposal for 
Islamic education in order to make just this point. 
18 Burtt, “Comprehensive Educations,” 190. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., 191. 
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education that she is trying to avoid is the “consumerist” notion that one’s way of life is 
merely a matter of personal preference. 
I agree with Burtt’s three key elements of an autonomy-facilitating education. I 
also agree with the concern that a form of autonomy-facilitating education like that 
proposed by Brighouse could lead to an emphasis on free choice being what matters most 
when it comes to autonomy. However, I do not think that familiarity with the idea of 
character pluralism is enough – students must in fact be presented with the range of views 
that character pluralism leads people to adopt. In other words, an autonomy-facilitating 
education requires that students be exposed to alternative ways of life, not just to the idea 
that different forms of life are good for different kinds of people. It is true that familiarity 
with character pluralism might be enough to lead some students to seek out alternatives, 
but I am unsure that students would be able to engage meaningfully with other ways of 
life on their own, especially if their homes, communities, and schools were steeped in one 
particular tradition. To return to the example of the gay student in a school that teaches 
that homosexuality is a sin, the idea of character pluralism might help him to realize that 
there are some who do not believe that homosexuality is sinful, but it would not help him 
to gain exposure these other views in such a way that he might, at some point, be able to 
consider them seriously.  
What I propose is a curriculum that falls between the proposals of Burtt and 
Brighouse. Like Burtt, I eschew the idea that directed critical engagement with a range of 
views is necessary for the facilitation of autonomy. However, like Brighouse, I believe 
that some engagement with a range of views is necessary for an autonomy-facilitating 
education. I call my proposed curriculum Worldview Education. What I present here is 
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not a detailed curriculum proposal — I will go into more detail in the next chapter. I 
intend this discussion to be an initial sketch of a worldview education, which describes its 
general aims and methods. By a worldview, I simply mean a comprehensive way of 
understanding the human condition, which typically includes views about the origin and 
nature of the universe, the origin and nature of humanity, and the form of a good human 
life. Broadly speaking, there are both religious and secular worldviews. Both claim, or 
sometimes claim, universal application but differ primarily in where they locate the 
sources of the worldviews. Religious worldviews tend to be grounded in sources of 
authority beyond humanity, while secular worldviews tend to be grounded in ideas 
produced solely by human thought.22 
The overarching premise of Worldview Education (WE) is the unquestionable 
fact that people hold a variety of worldviews, which include differing views about what it 
means to live well. A second premise of WE is that people have believed that they have 
actually led good lives within many, if not all, of the plurality of worldviews. We might 
disagree about whether some of these people have, as a matter of fact, led good lives, but 
the premise is simply that people have felt that they have experienced good lives through 
many different ways of understanding the world.23 (This is in line with Burtt’s idea of 
character pluralism.) A third premise is that it is useful to understand the variety of 
worldviews that people hold when one lives in a pluralistic society, even if one's own 
                                                
22 Buddhism, particularly in its Theravada form, might pose a problem for this scheme, as represented by 
the common discussion of whether Buddhism counts as a religion or a philosophy. The Buddha taught that 
his views were based simply on an understanding of the human condition that did not require reference to 
revelation. The source of his worldview was not beyond humanity. I will set this discussion aside, simply 
noting that Theravada Buddhism — and perhaps other worldviews, such as philosophical Daoism and 
Confucianism — might be classified as secular under this scheme.  
23 In other words, there are Muslims, Christians, and Hindus who would say that they are living good lives, 
just as there are atheists who would say the same. 
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view is not in question. This is so for the straightforward reason that it is difficult to 
understand others unless one has a sense of the underlying worldviews that are driving 
their lives.24 
Based on these premises, the curriculum for WE would consist of a survey of a 
variety of worldviews, focusing on their differing accounts of what it means to live well, 
in a way similar to the autonomy-facilitating curriculum that Brighouse proposes. (Burtt’s 
version of an autonomy-facilitating education would not require this.) Worldviews that 
locate the good life in submission to authority would be presented alongside worldviews 
that view the good life necessarily as a matter of autonomous choice. In each case, the 
worldview would be presented from the point of view of the individuals or groups who 
hold the view — the view would not be presented as universally valid. In addition to 
teaching about various people's worldviews and corresponding conceptions of a good 
life, the curriculum would include explanations of why those people hold those views. In 
other words, the ways that people support their worldviews would be presented alongside 
the worldviews themselves. 
A crucial difference between WE and Brighouse's autonomy-facilitating 
education, however, is that the worldviews and conceptions of the good life would not be 
explicitly critiqued. If students raised questions about these understandings, then these 
questions could be addressed, but at no point would students be forced to critique the 
views, since this might mean critiquing their own views, or the views of their families. 
This is the facet of WE that could make it, as opposed to autonomy-facilitating education, 
                                                
24 This premise in fact suggests that WE can be justified without reference to autonomy. I believe that this 
is one of the strengths of WE: it will enable the facilitation of autonomy, but its inclusion in school 
curricula can be promoted for other reasons.   
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acceptable in some Islamic schools. At the same time, WE could be acceptable to 
Brighouse, because students would indeed be capable of exercising autonomy after 
learning about others' worldviews. It would not be a large step for students to move from 
the recognition that people hold a variety of views about the good life to the questioning 
of their own views, though this would not be touched upon in the classroom. In other 
words — and this is a major point — a form of education can facilitate autonomy without 
having to explicitly critique various ways of life. Simply learning about a variety of 
worldviews can be enough to facilitate autonomy. 
This might initially seem incorrect: how could WE facilitate autonomy even 
though it avoids critique, since Brighouse notes that critical reflection across a variety of 
worldviews is necessary for autonomy? To answer this question, my proposal does rely 
on two key assumptions about the schools and communities in which WE takes place. 
First, the school and community cannot be so oppressive that critical thinking is entirely 
snuffed out. In other words, there must be some avenue through which students could 
learn critical thinking skills. Critical thinking is, as Brighouse says, ultimately necessary 
in order to exercise autonomy. WE would provide the “raw material” for the facilitation 
of autonomy, but the critical thinking skills would have to come from other sources. The 
most likely source would be other parts of the school curriculum. Any school purporting 
to provide an education that prepares students for higher education would teach critical 
thinking skills in the traditional academic subjects, as Universal School and the CPSA do. 
In fact, it is likely that critical thinking would play a role in the religious aspects of the 
curriculum as well: interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunna, along with an understanding 
of the debates that occur between Islamic schools of law, both require the ability to think 
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critically across different Islamic worldviews. Critical thinking is entirely in line with 
Islamic tradition and these skills could transfer outside of the tradition. 
The second key assumption is that the school and community cannot be so 
oppressive that students have no hope of ever leaving — as Susan Moller Okin put it, the 
students must have “exit rights.”25 In other words, students would need to have open to 
them the possibility of exercising autonomy at some point in their lives. Learning about 
different worldviews and developing the ability to think critically — the two things 
necessary for a form of education to facilitate autonomy — would ultimately be 
meaningless if there was no possibility of changing one’s way of life. For instance, if our 
high-achieving female student lived in a community where any girls expressing 
aspirations to pursue careers outside of the domestic sphere were put to death, she would 
have no real hope of leaving, even if she realized that there were other ways of life 
available to her were she to resituate herself. 
Both of these assumptions would hold true in any reasonable form of religious 
education. Of course, one can imagine religious schools that solely provide rote learning 
and are situated in communities where exit is practically impossible, and WE would have 
no traction in these places. However, many religious schools are not like this, as 
demonstrated by Universal School and the CPSA. Universal School and the CPSA both 
emphasize that they provide an education for students that includes critical thinking skills 
and they both hope to send students to college, with this mission even being enshrined in 
the name of the latter school. (I will discuss how Qaradawi’s proposal is problematic in 
light of these two assumptions momentarily, however.) 
                                                
25 Susan Moller Okin, “’Mistresses of Their Own Destiny’: Group Rights, Gender, and Realistic Rights of 
Exit” in Citizenship and Education in Liberal-Democratic Societies, eds. McDonough and Feinberg. 
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Further, the fact that WE need not explicitly critique ways of life would not 
prevent students from being exposed to critiques from various forms of media: books, 
magazines, television, and movies, to say nothing of the Internet. Armed with exposure to 
different worldviews and critical thinking skills, students would be able to pursue critical 
engagement on their own time as they grew into adults. The important point, however, is 
that this engagement would not happen within the WE curriculum. This curriculum 
would simply be presenting views: Muslims believe in worldviews that say that the good 
life is A, B, or C; Christians believe that it is D, E, or F; positive psychologists argue that 
it is G, H, or I; philosophers claim that it is J, K, or L; and so forth. Similarities and 
differences between the views would be presented; it would be a comparative curriculum. 
This comparative approach would likely involve a kind of implicit critique — it would be 
clear that Muslims, Christians, and secular philosophers disagreed on certain matters, for 
instance — but the views would not be endorsed, and the views would not be challenged. 
They would simply be offered up in a survey of what people have believed and do 
believe about the world and what it means to live well within it. 
As I have noted, WE would not be acceptable to people who only wanted children 
to be exposed to their own worldviews, whether those views were secular or religious. 
But I do think — in line with my third premise behind WE — that it would be acceptable 
to people who believe that there is value in learning about others' views, even if they 
believe that their own view is correct. However, for this to hold, WE would have to strive 
to be unbiased. It would have to present worldviews just from the perspectives of the 
people holding them, not from the perspective of the teacher or the school.26 It would also 
                                                
26 There is an extensive literature on the possibility of neutrality in teaching, which I do not want to delve 
into here, as I fear it would derail my discussion. See, for instance, Paul J. Crittenden, “Neutrality in 
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have to be pluralistic, presenting a wide variety of worldviews. This means that WE 
could not be confined to a single course, or a single year — it would have to extend 
throughout a child's schooling.27 
Also, WE would require a method of dealing with offensive views. This is one of 
the great challenges of developing a WE curriculum, because what counts as offensive 
can vary from one context to another. Certain views, such as those associated with 
Nazism, are considered offensive by a vast majority of people, and these could be left 
out. However, atheist views might be offensive only to some religious individuals; and 
conservative religious views might be offensive only to those of a liberal persuasion. A 
line has to be drawn in order to separate the offensive from the inoffensive in the context 
of WE, if it is to be a curriculum that could be used in a wide variety of Islamic (and 
other religious) schools. This cannot be left to the discretion of the individual school, 
because this could compromise the pluralism of WE. 
The key to addressing potentially offensive viewpoints is, I think, to err on the 
side of inclusivity. This would mean that offensive views would be included in WE, 
though the perception of which views were offensive would vary from one community to 
the next. For instance, WE would present worldviews from certain branches of 
evangelical Christianity, which involve the rejection of homosexuality as a sin. It would 
also present the worldviews of certain atheists, which involve the rejection of evangelical 
                                                                                                                                            
Education,” Educational Philosophy and Theory 12 (1980). Admittedly, it would be difficult for a teacher 
to remain completely neutral in the teaching of WE, but by presenting the worldviews through the 
perspectives of people holding those views, hopefully teacher bias would be limited. 
27 This would, of course, mean a significant reorganization of school curriculum. This work would be a 
necessary part of producing a more detailed curriculum proposal for WE, as I will attempt in the next 
chapter. 
  87 
religion and its understanding of sin. On the one hand, communities characterized by a 
nearly universal acceptance of evangelical Christianity would find the former inoffensive, 
while likely finding the latter to be offensive. On the other hand, communities with, say, 
a strong presence of LGBT advocacy organizations would find the former offensive, 
while likely finding the latter inoffensive. I believe that allowing WE to present offensive 
views can be justified in the following ways: First, none of the views would be endorsed. 
Second, the mission of WE is to help students understand how a wide variety of people 
have conceived and do conceive of the world and what it means to live well within it. 
Third, since WE is necessarily comparative, the offensive view would be presented 
alongside a large number of other views, including some that critique and reject it. 
Fourth, the views presented by WE could be freely challenged outside of the curriculum. 
The power of any curriculum should not be overestimated. 
A key advantage of using WE in Islamic schools is that it would teach students 
why some people value autonomy while also demonstrating why some people value 
commitment to submission to the will of God. WE takes seriously both autonomy and 
religious commitment as sources of a life well lived. But it would not endorse either of 
these views. At the same time, while WE would not explicitly lead students through a 
critical engagement with these views, every view it presents would be challenged 
implicitly by the other views presented alongside it, even though WE itself would not 
endorse these challenges. 
Would WE be acceptable as a component of the curriculum in the context of the 
educational proposals we discussed in Chapters 2 and 3? Would Brighouse find this to be 
an acceptable form of autonomy-facilitating education, and would Qaradawi, Universal 
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School, and the CPSA find it acceptable within an Islamic education? Brighouse would 
likely want WE to be more critical of the views it presents, but, as I have discussed, 
critical thinking skills could come from other parts of a school's curriculum. As long as 
this was the case, WE would contribute to the facilitation of autonomy, and as such I see 
no reason why Brighouse would be opposed to it as a way of facilitating autonomy in 
Islamic schools. Universal School and the CPSA would likely find WE to be acceptable, 
given that it would not explicitly critique Islam and that the Islamic environment and 
religious education curriculum of these schools would prevent WE from interfering with 
the Islamic character of their forms of Islamic education. However, it is unlikely that WE 
would work within an educational proposal like Qaradawi’s, which steers too closely 
toward the fundamentalist end of the spectrum of Islamic education.28 Qaradawi does 
want students to learn about other worldviews, though it is clear that his aim is to 
demonstrate how non-Islamic ways of life are, simply put, wrong. Even some Islamic 
worldviews would be presented as incorrect within Qaradawi’s proposal, given that he is 
intent on pushing a particular understanding of Islam. 
The consideration of Qaradawi raises the point that WE would be thwarted in 
schools where indoctrination plays a central role.29 This connects to the point I made 
previously about the oppressiveness of a school and community potentially undermining 
WE. A key feature of WE, recall, is that worldviews would be presented in as unbiased a 
                                                
28 I should note that WE might also be unacceptable to those who advocate autonomy-promoting education. 
For instance, Amy Gutmann would likely be critical of WE on the grounds that it does not go far enough in 
terms of critical engagement with different ways of life. 
29 Perhaps the best introduction to the concept of indoctrination in education is Ivan A. Snook, 
Indoctrination and Education (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972). Snook writes, “A person 
indoctrinates P (a proposition or set of propositions) if he teaches that with the intention that the pupil or 
pupils believe P regardless of the evidence.” (47) 
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way as possible. While it is likely that students in a school based on Qaradawi’s proposal 
would develop some form of critical thinking through critiquing non-Islamic and some 
Islamic understanding, this thinking would be presented in the context of an education 
ultimately designed to inculcate in students the unquestionable acceptance of a particular 
understanding of Islam. Qaradawi’s students would be exposed to other worldviews, but 
it is difficult to see how they could take these worldviews seriously, since they would be 
vilified to such an extent that students would realistically have little chance of adopting a 
view outside of the narrow range of views that are acceptable to Qaradawi. The bottom 
line is that WE would only work in contexts that allow for the possibility of choosing (or 
not choosing) to exercise autonomy. 
Humanity is very unlikely to reach universal agreement on how to attain the good 
life. Pluralism is not a problem to be solved; it is a fact that must be dealt with if diverse 
individuals want to live together. It must particularly be dealt with in a society's 
educational landscape. Some Muslims would be leery of Brighouse’s autonomy-
facilitating education because it would involve critique of their own views; some liberals 
are leery of Islamic schools because students might not be able to consider other 
worldviews that could allow them to lead better lives. I believe that WE offers a 
compromise between these views. By removing the element of critique from Brighouse’s 
proposal, as long as critical thinking is taught in other parts of a school’s curriculum, WE 
would ensure that students were capable of becoming autonomous – as Brighouse desires 
– while also ensuring that the Islamic character of a school would not be weakened – as 
Islamic educators desire. In the next chapter, I will describe in more detail how WE could 
be implemented in moderate Islamic schools, such as Universal School and the CPSA. 
  




FLESHING OUT WORLDVIEW EDUCATION 
In Chapter 4, I argued that a curriculum that I call Worldview Education (WE) 
could serve as a way to provide for an autonomy-facilitating education in Islamic schools 
such as Universal School and the College Preparatory School of America, which I 
described in Chapter Two. WE is a modification of Harry Brighouse’s autonomy-
facilitating education, which I described in Chapter 3. Brighouse proposes that a 
curriculum that guides students through a process of critical reflection across a range of 
ways of life can enable students to exercise autonomy without actively encouraging them 
to do so: it facilitates autonomy, rather than promoting it. However, I argued that 
Brighouse’s proposal would be problematic for many Islamic schools in that it would 
require critique of Islamic ways of life, which could undermine Islamic education’s 
primary aim of guiding students into, and along, the straight path of Islam. My proposal 
for WE addresses this concern by retaining Brighouse’s suggestion of presenting students 
with a variety of ways of life while removing the critical element that Islamic schools 
would find troubling. Although critical thinking is necessary for the exercise of 
autonomy, I argued that the skills relevant to critical reflection would be obtained 
throughout the curriculum in any Islamic school that hopes to prepare students for higher 
education. Even the aspects of the curriculum that deal with Islamic thought could 
provide for critical thinking, since debate about the proper interpretation of the Qur’an 
and the Sunna – the key sources of Islam – are prominent in the Islamic tradition, 
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especially in the field of Islamic law. While it is true that some Islamic schools might not 
present this debate in such a way as to promote critical thinking – they might, for 
instance, teach a particular understanding of Islam as correct and fail to engage the intra-
Islamic debates – these schools would teach the skills needed for critical thinking in the 
traditional curriculum: English, social studies, math, science, and so forth. 
Therefore, one condition for the success of WE as a form of autonomy-facilitating 
education in Islamic schools is that critical thinking be taught in at least some aspects of 
the curriculum. The second major condition is that the school and community not be so 
oppressive that any realistic possibility of pursuing a different way of life is unavailable 
to students, even as they grow into adults. This level of oppression is hard to imagine in 
any Islamic school that guides students toward college, especially in America, where 
there are no Islamic colleges or universities that could serve to keep students in the fold. 
My argument, then, is that as long as these two conditions hold, WE can make an Islamic 
education an autonomy-facilitating education. It does so by exposing students to other 
worldviews through the eyes of those who accept them. This not only informs students 
that a range of worldviews exist – a point that would be hard to avoid, even without 
explicit instruction, for any student with access to the Internet – but also it teaches 
students about these views in such a way that the only biases would be those that are 
internal to the worldviews being presented. 
While I believe that a kind of WE could be formulated for use in K-8 Islamic 
schools, I am going to focus here on developing a curriculum proposal for WE in the 
traditional high school years: grades 9-12. I will present three alternative proposals 
concerning the form that WE could take. The first, and the most preferable in my view, 
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extends across all four years. I will have the most to say about this suggestion. The 
second form of WE would take place only in grade 12 as a one-year curriculum. The 
third is a form of WE that would be integrated into already existing portions of the 
curriculum. I will assume that an academic year consists of 36 weeks of instruction 
divided into two 18-week semesters or four 9-week periods. While I am imagining that 
these proposals would be implemented in Islamic schools, I should note that these 
proposals do not rely on an Islamic school setting. In fact, these proposals could be used 
in any high school that wanted to promote exposure to a variety of worldviews, whether 
on the grounds of coming to understand other people or on the grounds of contributing to 
the facilitation of autonomy. 
 
Four-Year Worldview Education 
Four years of WE would extend across eight 18-week semesters or sixteen 9-week 
periods. I believe that this form of WE is most preferable because it allows for the most 
in-depth coverage of the widest variety of worldviews. However, I recognize that this 
would essentially involve adding a new subject to the high school curriculum, which is 
something that many schools would find difficult to do in their already full schedules. 
There are also other concerns connected to introducing WE as a standalone subject in 
high schools, which I will address at the conclusion of this section. 
The four years of WE would cover the following topics, chosen based on 
worldviews that significant numbers of people hold: 
• Judaism 
• Christianity 
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• Islam 
• Hinduism 
• Buddhism and Jainism 
• East Asian Traditions: Confucianism and Daoism 
• Indigenous religious traditions and new religious movements, including Shinto, 
Mormonism, and Sikhism 
• Secularism (i.e., worldviews that do not rely on sources beyond humanity) 
It might seem strange that I have included Islam in this list, given that it is likely that 
Islam would receive sufficient coverage in the religious education curriculum of Islamic 
schools. However, this portion of the WE curriculum could focus on specific branches of 
Islam that the religious education curriculum does not cover. For instance, in a 
predominantly Sunni community, it is possible that Shi‘a Islam would not receive much 
attention within religious education; it could be covered in WE instead.1 In addition, 
Islam would have to be a part of WE in non-Islamic schools as well. 
I have proposed eight units, one per semester or two nine-week periods. The order 
of the units could be altered, though Judaism, Christianity, and Islam should form a 
sequence, as should Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism, as these traditions build off of 
one another. Christianity arises out of Judaism, and Islam makes reference to both. 
Buddhism and Jainism both arise as responses to Hinduism. I would also suggest that 
secular worldviews remain at the end of the curriculum, in part because they can be 
understood as a response to religious worldviews and in part because they require a study 
                                                
1 This basic point could apply to other religious schools as well. For instance, Catholic schools would 
obviously include sufficient coverage of Catholicism, but might not include much discussion of other forms 
of Christianity, such as Protestantism or Orthodoxy. These branches of Christianity could be covered in 
WE.  
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of philosophy that would be best undertaken by students at the end of their high school 
years. 
I have chosen these eight units because they cover the world. Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam, while all initially appearing in West Asia, have a significant 
presence across the globe – Judaism through immigration and Christianity and Islam 
primarily through missionary efforts. Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism appeared in 
South Asia, but have also spread: Buddhism underwent significant development in East 
Asia, while each of these traditions has achieved a global presence as adherents have 
immigrated to a variety of countries. Confucianism and Daoism represent key sources of 
Chinese thought. The indigenous tradition unit would cover worldviews that have largely 
remained localized in the Americas (Native American traditions), Africa (African tribal 
traditions), and Japan (Shinto), while also including worldviews that emerged as 
indigenous traditions but have spread through missionary work and immigration 
(Mormonism and Sikhism). Secular worldviews of course have a global presence, though 
they are most prevalent in Western countries, especially those of Europe, and modern 
China, where communism (and its official position of atheism) is dominant. These eight 
units therefore allow WE to cover many parts of the world while including the 
worldviews that continue to dominate human activity. Most of the world’s over six 
billion people accept a form of one of these worldviews. 
Each unit would cover roughly eighteen weeks, and would be set up as an 
introduction to the worldview under consideration, similar to the one-semester 
introductions that are common in many colleges and universities: Intro to Judaism, Intro 
to Christianity, Intro to Buddhism, and so forth. This is an advantage for this proposal, 
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since there are already resources available for teaching one-semester courses on most of 
these topics, though they would have to be adapted for use by high school students. 
Typically, these introductory courses are set up chronologically: they begin with the 
emergence of the tradition, progress through key phases in its development, and conclude 
with a look at the role the tradition plays in the contemporary world. I am generalizing 
here, of course – there are other ways to run introductory courses on worldviews – but I 
believe that the chronological approach would work best, as it tends to present the 
clearest picture of the foundational components of a worldview (which can be discussed 
as part of a tradition’s emergence) and how those components have been understood in 
different ways as a tradition has developed branches and varying schools of thought. 
Given eighteen weeks, then, the general pattern of a worldview unit would be as 
follows: 
• Emergence of the tradition, including foundational beliefs and practices. 
• Development of the tradition, including the emergence of diverse branches or 
schools of thought. 
• Contemporary expressions of the tradition, focusing on topical case studies. 
Each of these topics would receive roughly equal coverage: six weeks each in an 
eighteen-week semester. As an example of how this pattern would play out with a 
particular tradition, I will go into more detail about the Christianity unit. 
The first six weeks of the Christianity unit would focus on the emergence of the 
tradition by studying the writings that make up the New Testament. The first week would 
present the historical and social context of the emergence of Christianity by discussing 
the state of Judaism in Palestine when Jesus lived. Weeks two and three would look at the 
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four canonical gospels – Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John – emphasizing how each 
presents a different picture of the figure of Jesus and how his message should be 
understood. The fourth and fifth weeks would draw attention to the letters of Paul in 
order to discuss how Christianity initially took root in a number of communities 
established by the apostles. The sixth week would look at the other books of the New 
Testament, the so-called catholic letters and the Book of Revelation, in order to describe 
further issues faced by the early Christian communities and the role of apocalypticism in 
Christian thought. Throughout these six weeks, the New Testament itself would be the 
primary source material, supplemented by other readings that place the New Testament in 
context. 
The second six weeks would present the development of the Christian tradition 
through Augustine, Aquinas, and the emergence of distinct branches of Christianity 
through Orthodoxy and Protestantism. Week seven would look at Augustine, and week 
eight would turn to Aquinas. These weeks would also serve as an introduction to Catholic 
Christianity. Week nine would examine Orthodoxy, and weeks ten through twelve would 
explore Protestantism. 
The remaining six weeks of the unit on Christianity would be taken up with 
topical case studies that would examine the role of Christianity in the contemporary 
world. Each week would focus on a different topic. Topics for these weeks could include 
the role of women in Christianity; the place of Christianity in American politics; 
Christianity’s position on other religions; the rise of evangelical Christianity; the variety 
of Christianity in America; and global Christianity, or the different forms that 
Christianity has taken as it has spread throughout the world. 
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While much of the Christianity unit would work with the study of texts, there 
would also ideally be time set aside for visits from local Christian ministers representing 
a variety of forms of Christianity and field trips to local churches that would emphasize 
not only the ways that services occur but also the reasons that different Christian 
churches are laid out in different ways. The hope is that the visits from ministers and the 
field trips would help students to understand how contemporary Christians actually 
practice their religion. Christianity is not just a set of texts, beliefs, and practices, but a 
worldview that people actually believe, which drives their lives. 
The units that cover multiple traditions, including the unit on secularism, would 
have to follow a slightly different format. For multiple traditions, each would receive a 
compressed version of the emergence/development/contemporary expressions pattern. 
For instance, with indigenous religious traditions and new religious movements, three 
weeks would be spent on traditions indigenous to the Americas, three weeks on traditions 
indigenous to Africa, two weeks on traditions indigenous to Australia, two weeks on 
Shinto, two weeks on Mormonism, two weeks on Sikhism, and four weeks on new 
religious movements. 
Covering secular worldviews in a semester would require some selectivity. The 
focus of this unit would be on worldviews that have emerged primarily from the field of 
philosophy. Ryan Haczynski, a Florida public school teacher, has had some success 
teaching philosophy to high school students. He uses a textbook by Douglas J. Soccio 
entitled Archetypes of Wisdom.2 The book offers an overview of major philosophical 
                                                
2 The latest edition of this book is Douglas J. Soccio, Archetypes of Wisdom: An Introduction to 
Philosophy, 7th ed. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 2009). Haczynski has indicated to me via email that he 
uses the 5th edition, from 2003. 
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ideas. It complements this overview with brief selections from key works. Haczynski 
uses brief lectures that summarizing the main ideas presented in the text as a launching 
point for class discussions about the concepts. While it would be ideal to engage students 
directly with the primary philosophical sources themselves, these texts might prove 
inaccessible to some (or many) high school students. The use of the textbook and lectures 
has allowed Haczynski to lead students to an understanding of the concepts while 
avoiding the difficulties that philosophical writing sometimes presents. There are, of 
course, other models for teaching philosophy to pre-college students, and the 
development of this portion of the WE curriculum could draw from this work. 
Ultimately, elaborating on each of the units in the four-year WE curriculum 
would require an extensive amount of work. Further, I noted previously that there are 
concerns that would have to be addressed for a four-year program of WE to function 
effectively in high schools. Perhaps the most important of these concerns relates to who 
would teach WE. In high schools that currently offer electives in world religions, 
instructors who are certified in social studies or English typically teach these courses. 
However, if WE is to become its own subject in the high school curriculum, there will be 
a need for teachers who are certified specifically in this area. In countries where religious 
education (RE) is an established subject, like the UK, this is already done. Teachers can 
become certified in RE just as teachers can become certified in math or science. In 
countries like this, there would already be a pool of instructors qualified to teach WE, 
given its heavy emphasis on religion. Yet in the US, no such certification exists. 
The best way to address this would be to introduce a WE certification into teacher 
certification programs. Students in religious studies would be ideal candidates for this 
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certification, and a certification track could be developed by introducing courses into 
teacher education curricula dealing with pedagogical practices for teaching about 
religion. Another possibility would be to draw WE teachers from those certified in social 
studies or English who have academic backgrounds in religious studies. Either way, this 
concern would have to be dealt with if WE were to become widespread as a high school 
subject, since teachers would have to be sufficiently well versed in the religious traditions 
in order to teach semester-long units about them. 
Another concern relates to resources that could be used to teach WE. As I noted 
previously, there are college-level resources for teaching introductory courses on the 
religious traditions, but these resources might have to be adapted for use in high schools. 
Additionally, while there are sample syllabi and assignments available through sources 
such as the journal Teaching Theology & Religion and the American Academy of 
Religion, this material is based on a college schedule, where course meet two or three 
days a week, and they would not translate directly to a high school where a WE class met 
every day. The point is that lesson plans for WE would have to be developed in order to 
facilitate its introduction into the high school curriculum. This is important not only so 
that each individual teacher does not have to invent the curriculum from scratch, but also 
so that best practices could be developed for WE. Much work has gone into producing 
effective methods for teaching in the traditional subjects, while less work has gone into 
producing such methods for the units included in WE. 
I think that a key element of any movement to include WE in the high school 
curriculum would be to involve those who teach about religion and philosophy at the 
college level. Introductory religion and philosophy courses are staples at most community 
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colleges, colleges, and universities, and the instructors and professors who teach these 
courses have given thought to how such courses should be taught. Ideally, teacher 
training in WE would be achieved by having prospective WE teachers work with these 
college-level instructors, primarily in two ways. First, WE teachers would be religious 
studies majors with at least some coursework in philosophy. Through their coursework, 
they would be able to see what it looks like to teach about religion and philosophy. 
Second, WE teachers would take courses as part of their certification in which they could 
reflect upon the approaches to teaching religion and philosophy that they had experienced 
in their coursework. These “Worldview Education Pedagogy” courses would be taught, at 
first, by experienced college-level instructors, though eventually they would be taught by 
experienced WE teachers. 
There is in fact a model for this kind of teacher preparation at Harvard University. 
For almost 40 years, the Harvard Divinity School ran a Program in Religious Studies and 
Education, which offered a Master’s degree through the Divinity School with a special 
focus on teaching about religion. In 2011, this program was succeeded by a Certificate in 
Religious Studies and Education, which is essentially a graduate minor consisting of 5 
courses, two of which are required and deal specifically with religion and education and 
three of which must be electives that deal with religious traditions. In addition, the 
Harvard Divinity School initiated the Religious Literacy Project, which aims to bring 
together resources to aid in teaching about religion in K-12 schools. Diane L. Moore 
heads the Religious Literacy Project and has been a driving force behind the Religious 
Studies and Education programs at Harvard; she also chairs the American Academy of 
Religion’s Task Force on Religion in the Schools, which has produced a 36-page 
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document entitled “Guidelines for Teaching About Religion in K-12 Public Schools in 
the United States” after a 3-year effort that involved regular feedback from outside of the 
task force gathered at the AAR’s Annual Meetings.3 
The point of bringing this up is to show that there is a nascent pool of resources 
for teaching about religion in high schools that could be brought to bear to support the 
inclusion of WE as a subject in the high school curriculum. In fact, in addition to Moore’s 
work through the Harvard Divinity School and the AAR, the Department of Religious 
Studies at California State University, Chico, has operated an online Religion and Public 
Education Resource Center since 1995.4 And this is say nothing of the resources available 
by looking to the UK and Western Europe, where scholars have published numerous 
books and establish journals such as The British Journal of Religious Education as part of 
developing the subject of Religious Education that many of those countries have in place. 
Establishing WE in Islamic schools, or in American schools generally, would not have to 
involve reinventing the wheel. 
 
One-Year Worldview Education 
While I believe that a four-year form of WE would be most effective in informing 
students about the widest variety of worldviews, a one-year form of WE in grade 12 is a 
                                                
3 For more on Diane Moore, see her Harvard Divinity School faculty page at 
http://www.hds.harvard.edu/people/faculty/diane-l-moore. For more on the Certificate program, see its 
Harvard University Extension School catalog description at http://www.extension.harvard.edu/degrees-
certificates/professional-certificates/religious-studies-education-certificate. For more on the Religious 
Literacy Project, see the Harvard Divinity School’s page about it at http://www.hds.harvard.edu/faculty-
research/programs-and-centers/religious-literacy-project. The “Guidelines” document is available from the 
website of the American Academy of Religion at 
http://aarweb.org/Publications/Online_Publications/Curriculum_Guidelines/AARK-
12CurriculumGuidelines.pdf.  
4 See the homepage of the Religion and Public Education Resource Center at 
http://www.csuchico.edu/rperc/index.shtml. 
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more realistic option for many schools because it would be easier to fit it into the existing 
curriculum. This form of WE would also be easier to implement in that it would not 
require as much specialized training on the part of the teacher. In addition, there are more 
resources available for teachers to use for a one-year WE, since materials that are used 
for introductory world religions courses in colleges and universities could be adapted 
readily for use in grade 12. 
Given one year for WE, I would suggest covering the same eight units as in the 
four-year WE, though in a much compressed schedule. Rather than giving one semester 
over to each unit, each unit would be covered in two weeks (ten days). The general 
pattern of each unit would also remain the same as what I described for the four-year 
WE, though I would suggest three days for the emergence of the tradition, three days for 
the development of the tradition, and four days for contemporary expression of the 
tradition focused on topical case studies. There would be less room in this schedule for 
visits from religious leaders and/or field trips, but hopefully at least one of each could 
still be worked into the unit. I would suggest using an introductory college-level world 
religions textbook as the primary source for the course, especially since the course would 
be given in grade 12. 
 
Integrated Worldview Education 
The appeal of the integrated model of WE is that it does not require extra space in 
the high school curriculum. However, it would likely require modifications to the English 
and social studies portions. For instance, literature courses could include the study of 
world scriptures, like the Bible, the Qur’an, the Bhagavad Gita, and the Analects. History 
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courses could increasingly explore the role that worldviews have played in world history, 
sometimes leading groups of people into conflict and sometimes motivating people to 
pursue social justice. However, these kinds of modifications, just like my other proposal 
for WE, would require that educators be trained in order to teach them effectively. It 
would be difficult to teach the Bhagavad Gita, for instance, without some understanding 
of the role it played in the development of Hinduism; and it would be difficult to explain 
the work of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X toward civil rights without some 
understanding of the interpretations of Christianity and Islam that drove them. 
 
Final Words 
In order for Worldview Education to become a viable way of allowing for 
autonomy-facilitating education in Islamic schools, much more work would have to be 
done that I have done here. In this chapter, I have only engaged in the initial steps of 
curriculum design. As I have noted, though, there are ample resources available for 
determining how WE could work.  
It should also be clear that much of my description of WE would not be exclusive 
to Islamic schools. In fact, I suggest that WE could serve as a way of providing an 
autonomy-facilitating education in any school where controversy might be raised by 
engaging in explicit critique of religious traditions. For instance, while critique would be 
technically allowed in American public schools, it is hard to imagine this being widely 
accepted – it would likely be seen as an attack on religion by many people, even if 
critique of secular worldviews was also included. The great strength of WE, in my view, 
is that it can facilitate autonomy without having to engage in such critique. At the same 
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time, students would still be capable of critically reflecting about worldviews if they 
combined the information garnered through WE with the critical thinking skills hopefully 
developed in other parts of the curriculum. It is true that students would have to take this 
step on their own, but they would have the resources to be able to do so, especially with 
the wide range of information they could explore on the Internet. Through WE, they 
would learn how to take the diversity of worldviews seriously – how to understand that a 
plurality of worldviews are central to how people live differently in the world – and this 
would enable them to think about worldviews seriously across the course of their lives. 
This would not mean that students would necessarily abandon the worldviews of their 
parents, schools, or communities, but it would give them the chance of doing so if they 
found certain aspects of these worldviews troubling. 
In addition to the fact that WE can contribute to an autonomy-facilitating 
education in a way that some religious schools could accept, there are other benefits to 
WE. The most important is that it would serve as a form of multicultural education by 
engaging students with the worldviews that underlie different cultures. This, I think, is a 
justification for the inclusion of WE in schools just as crucial as the justification related 
to autonomy. Also, for both of these reasons, WE would be beneficial to students at all 
schools – not just those in Islamic schools. For instance, I suspect that American public 
schools do not sufficiently facilitate autonomy in the way that Brighouse would want, in 
part because they do not sufficiently expose students in a serious way to different ways of 
life, especially those that are most prominent outside of America. Other ways of life 
might come up in history or literature courses, but this is usually in the context of 
describing world events or discussing a specific work, not in the context of illuminating 
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the basic beliefs that motivate people as they live their lives. A curriculum like WE could 
do much to enable students to become global citizens by providing them with information 
that would help them to understand people outside of their communities while also giving 
them a key resource to help them to think reflectively about how they will live in the 
world. However, this is a line of argument for a different time. In the end, I believe that 
WE provides a way to uphold personal autonomy – a core tenet of liberalism – while not 
undermining the importance of commitment to a worldview in many people’s lives. 
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